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Ann M. Scarlett∗
I. INTRODUCTION
This decade has exposed numerous corporate scandals that have 
shaken shareholders, directors, and the markets.  The wave of scandals 
that began in 2001 at corporations such as Enron and WorldCom 
revealed directors and officers out of control.1  Thereafter, a more 
insidious scandal struck, involving directors and officers backdating their 
stock options in their own self-interest at corporations such as Apple, 
McAfee, Monster, and Bed Bath & Beyond.2  Congress, the SEC, and the 
listing companies responded to these scandals by imposing new, more 
restrictive requirements on corporations and their directors and officers.3
Shareholders also responded with attempts to take more control of the 
corporations in which they hold stock on issues such as environmental 
∗  Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University.  This Article has benefited from 
comments by participants at Washington Universitys Regional Junior Faculty Works-in-Progress 
workshop, by participants at a faculty colloquium of the University of Oklahoma College of Law, 
and by my colleagues in a summer workshop at Saint Louis University.  I thank Patrick Pedano and 
Stephanie Gwillim for their excellent research assistance. 
1. See, e.g., E. Norman Veasey, State-Federal Tension in Corporate Governance and the 
Professional Responsibilities of Advisors, 28 J. CORP. L. 441, 44142 (2003) (noting the Enron and 
WorldCom scandals revealed that (1) officers ran amok, wallowing in greed-driven schemes and 
other abuses; and (2) directors allowed it to happen, tolerating officers who were managing to the 
market while they contented the directors with ever-rising stock prices). 
 2. Charles Forelle & James Bandler, As Companies Probe Backdating, More Top Officials 
Take a Fall, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2006, at A1 (discussing the backdating scandals occurring at, 
among others, Apple Computer Inc., McAfee Inc., Monster Worldwide Inc., and Bed Bath & 
Beyond Inc.). 
3. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (Supp. IV 2004); id. § 301, 
15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (forcing listing companies to impose more restrictive requirements on public 
companies); NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.02 (2004) (stating new, more restrictive 
definition of director independence); NASDAQ, Inc., Marketplace Rules, R. 4200(a)(15) (2004) 
(similar).  As argued elsewhere, the Delaware courts also responded to the recent scandals by 
allowing more cases to survive pretrial motions asserting the business judgment defense, but they 
have not altered the current formulation of the business judgment rule.  Ann M. Scarlett, Confusion 
and Unpredictability in Shareholder Derivative Litigation: The Delaware Courts Response to 
Recent Corporate Scandals, 60 FLA. L. REV. 589, 60304 (2008). 
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standards and labor rights, as well as on matters that may entrench 
directors in their positions or lead directors to promote their own 
interests at the expense of shareholders.4  Yet, litigation remains a device 
commonly employed by shareholders when boards of directors abuse 
their power.  Recent shareholder derivative actions against Apple, 
Citigroup, Tyson Foods, Walt Disney, and Enron, among others, 
demonstrate that judicial recourse remains a powerful tool used by 
shareholders.5
Shareholder derivative litigation, however, rarely succeeds in 
holding directors liable for their decisions.  One reason is the business 
judgment rule defense, which protects boards of directors from legal 
liability in most such cases.6  Under courts current formulation, the 
business judgment rule operates as a presumption that the defendant-
directors have acted consistent with their fiduciary duties.7  If the 
plaintiff-shareholders cannot rebut this presumption, then the defendant-
directors cannot be held liable.8  In the unlikely event that the plaintiff-
shareholders rebut the presumption, then the defendant-directors must 
prove that the challenged transaction was fair to the corporation.9
Yet, despite evidence that shareholders rarely rebut the business 
judgment rule presumption and even in the aftermath of the recent 
scandals, some corporate scholars assert that courts are not providing 
sufficient protection to directors decisions under current law.10  Other 
scholars, however, claim that courts should exercise broader review of 
directors decisions.11  The true debate concerns the proper balancing 
point between directors authority to make decisions for the corporation 
and shareholders right to hold directors accountable for their decisions.12
4. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 5. Disputes between shareholders and directors and officers may be resolved through quasi-
judicial means such as arbitration, but judicial recourse remains the norm today. 
6. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927 (Del. 2003) (The business 
judgment rule, as a standard of judicial review, is a common-law recognition of the statutory 
authority to manage a corporation that is vested in the board of directors. (quoting MM Cos. v. 
Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1127 (Del. 2003))); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 
(Del. 1985) (stating the business judgment rule protect[s] and promote[s] the full and free exercise 
of the managerial power granted to Delaware directors), superseded by statute, DEL. CODE ANN. 
Tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1986), as recognized in Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85 (Del. 2001).
7. See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006); see also 
infra Part III.A. 
8. See Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989). 
9. See In re Walt Disney, 906 A.2d at 52. 
10. See infra Part III.C. 
11. See infra Part III.B. 
12. Cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND.
L. REV. 83, 109 (2004) (Establishing the proper mix of deference and accountability thus emerges 
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A balancing point that prohibits director liability in all but the most 
egregious cases would fulfill the purposes that originally led to the 
creation of the business judgment rule, such as protecting directors from 
Monday morning quarterbacking by shareholders, from honest mistakes 
of judgment, and from unpopular decisions.13  But finding a balancing 
point that respects directors authority, without completely eliminating 
the possibility of holding directors accountable for decisions not made in 
the best interests of the corporation, proves difficult in theory and in 
application. 
Even if corporate scholars could agree on the proper balancing point 
between authority and accountability, a complex problem of procedure 
needs to be resolved.  In a shareholder derivative action, the plaintiff-
shareholders seek to hold the defendant-directors accountable for their 
decisions and the defendant-directors inevitably assert that their 
decisions are protected by the business judgment rule.  Thus, the 
business judgment rule operates as the mechanism that balances the 
directors legal authority to manage the corporation against the 
shareholders right to hold those directors accountable for the decisions 
they make on behalf of the corporation.14  Because the business judgment 
rule is the mechanism by which courts balance authority and 
accountability, courts need a framework for applying the business 
judgment rule that achieves the desired balancing point. 
The authority versus accountability dilemma is not unique to 
corporations; it is prevalent throughout the law.  For instance, much 
scholarship has been devoted to that dilemma in the areas of international 
law and administrative law.15  However, corporate scholars have not 
explored the insights this scholarship may offer for corporate law.  This 
Article will do so.  Part II discusses the authority versus accountability 
dilemma by drawing upon the literature discussing that dilemma in other 
areas of law.  Section A examines the informal methods of accountability 
that have been identified through this literature, and analyzes how these 
methods may apply in the corporate context.  Section B then examines 
the formal methods of accountability and explores specific examples for 
the insights they may offer for corporate law. 
as the central problem in applying the business judgment rule to particular situations.).
13. See infra Part III.A. 
14. See Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 87 (arguing that the business judgment rule is the 
principal mechanism by which corporate law resolves that tension); id. at 84 (describing the 
business judgment rule as being designed to effect a compromiseon a case-by-case basis
between two competing values: authority and accountability). 
15. See infra Part II. 
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Part III analyzes the authority versus accountability dilemma 
presented in the corporate context.  In Section A, the Article focuses on 
legal accountability and describes the balancing of authority and 
accountability that occurs in shareholder derivative litigation through the 
current formulation of the business judgment rule.  Section B then 
examines and rejects corporate scholars proposals seeking to shift the 
balance more toward accountability in shareholder derivative litigation, 
including a proposal to abolish the business judgment rule and proposals 
to permit broader judicial review of directors decisions.  Section C then 
analyzes a recent proposal seeking to shift the balance more toward 
authority, by having courts adopt an abstention doctrine approach to the 
business judgment rule.  It demonstrates that the proposed abstention 
approach does not offer an effective replacement for the current 
formulation of the business judgment rule and that courts are unlikely to 
adopt it. 
Having rejected corporate scholars proposals for shifting the 
balance between authority and accountability in Part III, Part IV 
advocates for a new approach to the business judgment rule that offers a 
more effective framework for courts performing such balancing in 
shareholder derivative litigation.  Section A examines the benefits of a 
procedural mechanism versus a substantive mechanism for balancing 
authority and accountability in shareholder derivative litigation.  After 
recognizing the advantages of a procedural mechanism, Section B 
explains the benefits of applying the procedures surrounding the 
qualified immunity doctrine to the business judgment rule defense. 
II. THE AUTHORITY VERSUS ACCOUNTABILITY DILEMMA
The authority versus accountability dilemma can be seen in all facets 
of life as well as in the law.  Parents may give their teenager the authority 
to use one of the familys cell phones, but will hold the teenager 
accountable if he exceeds the phones pre-paid minutes.  A law firm may 
give their associates the authority to use the internet in performing their 
job functions, but will hold them accountable if they visit websites 
unrelated to their work such as pornography websites or their MySpace 
pages.16  A presidential election offers a more complex example of the 
authority versus accountability debate.  When voters elect an individual 
 16. Perhaps to some degree these examples reflect a sentiment to trust but verify.  See 
generally Ronald Reagan, U.S. President, Farewell Address to the Nation (Jan. 11, 1989), available 
at http://www.reaganfoundation.org/reagan/speeches/farewell.asp (describing how the United States 
should act toward the former Soviet Union). 
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to the Presidency (albeit indirectly through the Electoral College), they 
are concerned whether that President will act in their best interests: the 
President possesses substantial authority, but cannot effectively be held 
accountable for specific actions17 except through voters power not to re-
elect that President to a second term or perhaps through impeachment.18
Whenever one person (the principal) entrusts another (the agent) 
with authority to act, a classic agency problem is presented.19  The 
principal delegates certain authority to the agent to act on the principals 
behalf.  The principal, however, also wants the ability to hold the agent 
accountable if the agent fails to complete the assigned tasks or exceeds 
the authority given by the principal.  For a principal to hold an agent 
accountable, the principal first must know what the agent has done and 
also must have the ability to impose adverse consequences on the agent.  
Thus, measures to assure accountability require mechanisms for 
transmission of information as well as enforcement.20  The classic 
 17. In some respects, the Framers of the Constitution perhaps did not intend for the President to 
be subject to any accountability.  For instance, the Framers allocated to the President the sole power 
to wage war and the sole authority to grant pardons. 
Of all the cares or concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly demands 
those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand.  The direction of 
war implies the direction of the common strength; and the power of directing and 
employing the common strength, forms a usual and essential part in the definition of the 
executive authority. . . . He is also to be authorized to grant reprieves and pardons for 
offenses against the United States, EXCEPT IN CASES OF IMPEACHMENT. . . . As 
the sense of responsibility is always strongest, in proportion as it is undivided, it may be 
inferred that a single man would be most ready to attend to the force of those motives 
which might plead for a mitigation of the rigor of the law, and least apt to yield to 
considerations which were calculated to shelter a fit object of its vengeance.  The 
reflection that the fate of a fellow-creature depended on his sole fiat, would naturally 
inspire scrupulousness and caution; the dread of being accused of weakness or 
connivance, would beget equal circumspection, though of a different kind.  On the other 
hand, as men generally derive confidence from their numbers, they might often 
encourage each other in an act of obduracy, and might be less sensible to the 
apprehension of suspicion or censure for an injudicious or affected clemency.  On these 
accounts, one man appears to be a more eligible dispenser of the mercy of government, 
than a body of men. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 18. The President has presidential immunity for his or her official acts.  See Clinton v. Jones, 
520 U.S. 681, 696 (1997) (With respect to acts taken in his public characterthat is, official 
actsthe President may be disciplined principally by impeachment, not by private lawsuits for 
damages.). 
19. See generally WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP, § 1, at 24 
(3d ed. 2001). 
 20. Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Democracy, Accountability and Global 
Governance 34 (Harv. Univ. John F. Kennedy Sch. of Govt, Politics Research Group, Working 
Paper No. 01-4, 2001) (Accountable actions are explainable and sanctionable.  Principals can 
require agents to give reasons so that they can make judgments about their actions.  Thus some 
degree of transparency is essential for accountability.  Principals can also directly or indirectly 
sanction their agents if displeased with their actions.). 
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agency problem becomes more complex in the corporate context, but the 
tension between authority and accountability remains.21
A.  Accountability Through Informal, Non-Legal Methods 
Shareholder derivative litigation is not the only possible check on 
directors actions, as informal accountability mechanisms do exist.  A 
broad and diverse literature has developed on the topic of accountability, 
which identifies at least four informal processes through which 
accountability can occur: (1) electoral accountability, (2) hierarchical 
accountability, (3) reputational accountability, and (4) market 
accountability.22  Many of these informal accountability mechanisms 
apply in the corporate context and may act as restraints on directors 
authority at least to some degree. 
Perhaps the most common example of an informal accountability 
mechanism is electoral accountability, which can be seen in the 
democratic elections that occur every year in the United States.23
Electoral accountability is also exercised at corporations annual 
meetings of shareholders, when shareholders vote in person or by proxy 
for the next years board of directors.24  Shareholders elect the directors 
of the corporation25 and the law vests those directors with almost 
unlimited authority to manage the corporation.26  Because shareholders 
 21. Some corporate scholars disagree that an agency relationship exists between directors and 
shareholders, but even under the director primacy theory directors are supposed to act in the best 
interests of shareholders and thus the authority versus accountability dilemma still exists.  See, e.g.,
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW.
U. L. REV. 547 (2003) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Director Primacy]. 
 22. Keohane & Nye, supra note 20, at 45; see also GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY 7476 (David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi eds., 2004) (explaining the 
various accountability mechanisms such as peer accountability, public reputational accountability, 
market accountability, financial accountability, and legal accountability that are important within 
networks while noting that electoral accountability and hierarchical accountability are not applicable 
in networks); Erik B. Bluemel, Overcoming NGO Accountability Concerns in International 
Governance, 31 BROOK. J. INTL L. 139, 14954 (2005) (describing accountability mechanisms as 
including fiscal, market, supervisory, legal, peer, market, reputational, and hierarchical); Orna 
Rabinovich-Einy, Technologys Impact: The Quest for a New Paradigm for Accountability in 
Mediation, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 253, 261 (2006) (stating that accountability can be created 
through informal mechanisms such as by relying on professionalism or market forces to curb 
decision-maker discretion and encourage voluntary information disclosure on actions and related 
outcomes). 
 23. Keohane & Nye, supra note 20, at 45. 
 24. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2008); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.03(c) (2007). 
25. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211(b)212(b) (2008); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 
7.28, 8.03(c) (2007). 
26. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2008) (stating [t]he business and affairs of 
every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors); MODEL 
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elect the directors, an observer might think that shareholders possess the 
ability to hold directors accountable for the decisions they make on 
behalf of the corporation.  In theory, if a corporations shareholders 
believe that the current directors are not acting in the best interests of the 
corporation, they may hold those directors accountable for their decisions 
by voting them out of office through the election of new directors to the 
board.27  In reality, shareholders have limited ability to hold directors 
accountable for their decisions.  Shareholders possess no power to 
initiate corporate action28 and possess the right to vote on only a few 
matters such as election of directors, mergers, sales, dissolution, and 
amendments to the corporate charter and bylaws.29  Even director 
elections are essentially determined by the existing board, because the 
existing board typically nominates the slate of directors on which 
shareholders then vote.30  When a group of shareholders wants to 
nominate their own slate of directors, they typically must mount a costly 
and difficult proxy contest.31  Thus, shareholders often resort to filing a 
lawsuit on behalf of the corporation, which is called a shareholder 
derivative lawsuit, when they believe that the directors have not acted in 
the best interests of the corporation or that the directors have abused their 
power.32
Any classic agency relationship, such as the employer-employee 
relationship, represents hierarchical accountability.33  For instance, when 
the board of directors hires a CEO to run the daily affairs of the 
BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2007) (All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority 
of . . . and the business and affairs of the corporation . . . managed by or under the direction [of] . . . 
its board of directors . . . .). 
27. Cf. Keohane & Nye, supra note 20, at 3 (Accountability can be created through actions in 
the shadow of elections.). 
 28. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 105. 
 29. Id. at 105 n.133 (listing shareholder rights as election of directors and approval of charter 
or by-law amendments, mergers, sales of substantially all of the corporations assets, and voluntary 
dissolution).  Bainbridge also notes that only electing directors and amending the by-laws do not 
require board approval before shareholder action is possible.  Id. at 10506 n.133 (citing DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 109, 211); see also Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 21, at 56972 
(discussing the weak control rights of shareholders). 
 30. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 10506 n.133. 
 31. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, § 9.5.4, 39496 (1986).  However, the advent 
of electronic proxy voting may make such proxy contexts cheaper and easier.  Lynn A. Stout, The 
Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 807 n.47 (2007) (stating that 
electronic proxy voting may make it much cheaper and easier for dissenting shareholders to mount 
a proxy battle). 
32. See CLARK, supra note 31, at 396 (The derivative suit, or action brought on behalf of the 
corporation by a shareholder, solves collective action problems in an ingenious way.). 
33. Cf. Keohane & Nye, supra note 20, at 12 (In the international organizational model, the 
principal form of accountability is hierarchical: of agents to principals.). 
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corporation, the CEO is accountable to the board of directors.34  Thus, 
the board can fire the CEO at any time if the CEO does not act consistent 
with the boards instructions or, more generally, does not act in the best 
interests of the corporation.35  This hierarchical relationship is duplicated 
through every employee hired within the corporation.36  The shareholders 
and the directors, however, do not have a typical hierarchical 
relationship.  In theory, shareholders can remove directors from office at 
any time with or without cause, but such power often is restricted and 
shareholders can rarely coordinate such action.37
Reputational accountability refers to the embarrassment and damage 
that people may suffer if their poor choices or bad acts become known.38
Thus, as applied to corporations, directors will theoretically act in the 
best interests of the corporation for fear of damaging their professional 
and personal reputations.39  Obviously, a key to such accountability is 
awareness of the directors actions by the people to whom the directors 
feel connected either professionally or personally.  If directors actions 
are not transparent and are not publicly known, they need not fear 
reputational accountability.  Thus, publicity and transparency are vital to 
proper functioning of reputational accountability.40
A similar restraint on directors may occur through market 
accountability, such as when corporations are held responsible by 
consumers.41  In other words, market forces [may] curb decision-maker 
discretion and encourage voluntary information disclosure on actions and 
related outcomes.42  This form of accountability can be seen in 
corporations voluntary disclosures of adverse information in advance of 
34. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, § 5.8, 23140 (2002); 
CLARK, supra note 31, § 3.3.1, at 114. 
35. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 34, at 231 (stating all corporate powers are exercised by or 
under the boards authoritywhich includes the power to hire and fire). 
36. Cf. id. (In turn, corporate officers may delegate some of their responsibilities to less senior 
employees, and so forth down the organizational chart.). 
37. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2008); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.08 (2007). 
38. See Keohane & Nye, supra note 20, at 5 (Reputational accountability occurs through 
publicity.); Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 22, at 261 (stating that accountability can be created 
through informal mechanisms such as by relying on professionalism or market forces to curb 
decision-maker discretion and encourage voluntary information disclosure on actions and related 
outcomes). 
39. See Keohane & Nye, supra note 20, at 17 (Reputational accountability is crucial: without 
credibility, organizations and groups cannot become accepted as participants in the ongoing 
bargaining processes that produce outcomes.). 
40. Id. at 5. 
41. Id.
 42. Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 22, at 261; see also Keohane & Nye, supra note 20, at 3 
(Accountability can also be accomplished through markets, and as [a] result of publicity.). 
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such information being made public through other means, as well as 
corporations general concern about stock price.  Directors, both 
individually and as a board, can also exercise internal accountability 
through self-evaluation and internal review.43
These informal methods of accountability can be seen in other areas 
of law that also face the authority versus accountability dilemma.  The 
following sections briefly describe the authority versus accountability 
dilemmas presented in international law and administrative law, and 
demonstrate the functioning of the informal methods of accountability 
within these contexts.  Although the authority versus accountability 
dilemmas in international law and administrative law may be more 
complicated than the modern corporation, they reveal the limitations and 
ineffectiveness of informal methods of accountability. 
1. International Law 
In modern times, nations have consented to the formation of 
international organizations to facilitate nations relationships on such 
matters as international trade, international environmental standards, and 
international crimes.  The nature and extent of these international 
organizations authority varies as does the accountability of such 
organizations, but these various international organizations typically 
possess the authority to promulgate substantive rules that will affect 
private transactions and that often will supplant national law with 
international rules and standards.44  Their authority arises from the treaty 
commitments of their member nations.45  However, these international 
organizations authority to act is not absolute, as the international rules 
and standards they promulgate often require enforcement as well as 
implementation by member nations courts, administrative agencies, and 
legislative bodies.46
 43. Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 22, at 261. 
 44. Paul B. Stephan, The New International LawLegitimacy, Accountability, Authority, and 
Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1555, 155657 (1999); Sidney A. Shapiro, 
International Trade Agreements, Regulatory Protection, and Public Accountability, 54 ADMIN. L.
REV. 435, 436 (2002) (The public has an important stake in the adoption of international 
standards.). 
 45. Stephan, supra note 44, at 155657. 
46. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 44, at 436 (stating the government can make important 
decisions concerning the enforcement of international standards in the United States without 
effective public participation); Stephan, supra note 44, at 1557 (citing NAFTA as one such 
example); Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and 
Legitimacy, 17 NW. J. INTL L. & BUS. 681, 688 (1996) [hereinafter Stephan, Accountability] (Aside 
from the indirect discipline that voters impose on legislators and executives who participate in 
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Despite the somewhat limited authority possessed by some 
international organizations, many scholars argue that international 
lawmaking suffers from an accountability deficit.47  Rules that may 
have a real impact on the affairs of workers, consumers, entrepreneurs, 
and other people can come into force without those persons having either 
an adequate opportunity to influence their content . . . or to elect out of 
their application . . . .48  In other words, these international organizations 
may grant rights to and impose obligations on private individuals but 
give those individuals a diminished role in the development and 
implementation of these rights and duties.49
Accountability does exist in international law, but to a limited 
degree.50  For instance, international lawmakers face even weaker 
electoral accountability than domestic lawmakers.51  Although the 
member nations generally appoint their own bureaucratic representatives 
to serve on these international lawmaking bodies, these individuals are 
accountable only indirectly to the voters of their member nations.52
However, some executives of international organizations stand for direct 
elections by member nations.53  Hierarchical accountability also is 
minimal in this context.  Although member nations typically must agree 
in advance to the international commitments that [in turn] bind private 
actors,54 they often have little say in the rules and regulations 
international lawmaking, the principal mechanism for limiting the effect of international public 
legislation is the opportunity member states have to choose how to implement what the international 
body enacted.). 
 47. Stephan, supra note 44, at 1562; Stephan, Accountability, supra note 46, at 735. 
 48. Stephan, supra note 44, at 1562; see also Shapiro, supra note 44, at 44950 (explaining that 
the public has limited ability to participate in the creation of international standards). 
 49. Stephan, supra note 44, at 1563; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 101 (1986) (declaring that international law includes rules governing 
nations relations with persons, whether natural or juridical). 
50. See Keohane & Nye, supra note 20, at 4 (describing international law as hierarchical 
accountability, which can be seen in member nations power to remove the head of an international 
organization, rules restricting the discretion of such organizations, and member nations withholding 
their budgetary contributions). 
 51. Stephan, Accountability, supra note 46, at 682; see also Keohane & Nye, supra note 20, at 
12 ([I]n contrast to the realist world of untrammeled state power, the international organizational 
model builds-in a set of restraintshowever weak they may beon the exercise of power.); 
Stephan, supra note 44, at 1578 (The processes that generate the new international law are several 
steps removed from the usual mechanisms that hold lawmakers accountable for their decisions.). 
 52. Keohane & Nye, supra note 20, at 23; Michael A. Livermore, Note, Authority and 
Legitimacy in Global Governance: Deliberation, Institutional Differentiation, and the Codex 
Alimentarius, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 766, 778 (2006). 
 53. Keohane & Nye, supra note 20, at 12; Stephan, Accountability, supra note 46, at 682; see 
also Stephan, supra note 44, at 1578 (The processes that generate the new international law are 
several steps removed from the usual mechanisms that hold lawmakers accountable for their 
decisions.). 
 54. Stephan, supra note 44, at 1579; see also Stephan, Accountability, supra note 46, at 687 
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promulgated by these international organizations.  The exercise of the 
authority delegated to international lawmakers is not always subject to 
subsequent legislative ratification by member nations.55  [M]ost national 
legislatures have only two means of disciplining international 
lawmakers, because substituting a different rule is not an option.  They 
can reject the rule generated through the international process, or they 
can withhold funds from the lawmaking body.56  Much scholarship has 
argued that the absence of direct accountability threatens the legitimacy 
of the rules promulgated by these international organizations.57
Although international organizations may not be effectively held 
accountable through electoral accountability or hierarchical 
accountability,58 they can potentially be held accountable through the 
informal accountability methods of market accountability and 
reputational accountability.59  They also can be held accountable through 
rules governing how the organizations can operate, which may be 
monitored by independent organizations and courts.60  Similarly, 
monitoring activities by nations and their representatives potentially 
provide accountability of the international organizations to the member 
nations.61  Indeed, one of the common suggestions for improving the 
accountability of international organizations is to reform the process to 
achieve greater transparency and thus greater public participation.62
(More often, legislatures rely on the terms by which they initially accede to an international 
organization to limit what their executives, acting through those organizations, can accomplish.  And 
when international organizations later supersede such restrictions, the legislature may be left with a 
take-it-or-leave-it proposition.  At a minimum, it will not be able to modify what the organization 
produces without forcing an additional round of negotiations.  And if it refuses to accept the 
internationally agreed product and cannot force other countries to make changes, the legislature 
either will have to accede to an action that disregards its previous instructions or force the executive 
to resign from the organization.). 
 55. Stephan, Accountability, supra note 46, at 682; Keohane & Nye, supra note 20, at 12; see 
also Stephan, supra note 44, at 1578 (The processes that generate the new international law are 
several steps removed from the usual mechanisms that hold lawmakers accountable for their 
decisions.). 
 56. Stephan, Accountability, supra note 46, at 68283. 
 57. Livermore, supra note 52, at 77879; Keohane & Nye, supra note 20, at 23; see also 
Simon Burall & Caroline Neligan, The Accountability of International Organizations, GLOBAL 
PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES No. 2, at 9 (2005) (noting that the 
accountability mechanisms in place to ensure formal accountability do not work in the context of 
IGOs and that increasing the accountability of IGOs will require more robust internal accountability 
processes and a greater openness to external stakeholders); Ngaire Woods, Good Governance in 
International Organizations, 5 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 39, 44 (1999) (noting that accountability is 
lacking in many international organizations). 
 58. Keohane & Nye, supra note 20, at 12. 
59. Id. at 3, 17. 
60. Id. at 3. 
61. Id.
62. See Shapiro, supra note 44, at 45758 (stating that recommendation[s] focus[] on 
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However, without enforcement mechanisms, transparency alone does not 
solve the accountability equation. 
Admittedly, the authority possessed by these international 
organizations varies greatly, as do the mechanisms by which they may 
potentially be held accountable by member nations, but informal 
methods of accountability reign in this context.  And despite the 
extensive scholarship devoted to the authority versus accountability 
debate in the context of international law, international law does not 
seem to have achieved a satisfactory balancing of authority and 
accountability across these international organizations.  Indeed, the 
balance in international law appears strongly tilted toward authority as 
shown by the voluminous scholarship calling for more accountability 
over international organizations. 
2. Administrative Law 
The United States has numerous administrative agencies that impact 
the public as well as private individuals in areas such as health, 
education, and housing.  Congress gives these agencies the power to 
exercise authority by statute, without any specific constraints on their 
administrative discretion.63  Thus, these agencies power to affect 
regulation in their given area is largely unchecked.64
Hierarchical accountability is weak in the context of administrative 
law.  Although the President possesses the power to appoint and remove 
the heads of the various agencies, such power only permits the President 
to indirectly affect the actions of such agencies.65  Because the executive 
branch possesses such power, the public arguably holds some degree of 
electoral accountability, but this is an even weaker means of indirect 
transparency as a key procedural instrument to invoke more effective public participation); 
Stephan, supra note 44, at 1580. 
 63. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the 
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 496 (2003). 
 64. Jeffrey Rudd, Restructuring Americas Government to Create Sustainable Development, 30 
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. 371, 386 (2006).  Rudd proposes fixing this non-
accountability by having Congress limit administrative agency discretion and enact specific 
legislation providing penalties when agency heads fail to properly use their discretion, and also by 
reinstating judicial review of agency actions.  Id. at 46469. 
 65. Bressman, supra note 63, at 466, 48691; Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and 
the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 504 (1989) (Control 
over the power to appoint key government officials was an issue of intense concern for the Framers.  
Article II, section 2 of the Constitution, providing for presidential appointment of major officers with 
Senate consent, represented a deeply considered and much debated attempt to balance executive and 
legislative involvement in the selection process.). 
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accountability.66  Similarly, such power arguably provides some degree 
of transparency, which may deter improper motives and may indirectly 
allow the public to assign blame for any improper exercise of agency 
power.67  Yet, many commentators opine that the public lacks sufficient 
means to hold an agency accountable when that agency abuses its 
authority.  Typically, in the context of governments, [w]hen the state 
makes demands of its subjects, accountability means that the subjects 
have some means of affecting those demands, either by choosing in some 
fashion who may exercise the power to make those demands (voice) or 
by taking steps to place themselves outside their scope (exit).68  Neither 
option exists in the publics relationship with administrative agencies.  
Just as with international law, the balance appears weighted strongly 
toward authority. 
Arguably these administrative agencies present a close analogy to 
corporations.  Voters elect the President (albeit indirectly through the 
Electoral College), and the President then appoints agency heads to act 
consistent with the Presidents view of wise policy choices as explained 
to voters during the campaign.  The Presidents power to hold a 
particular agency accountable for its actions is limited to removing the 
politically-appointed agency head.  The public, however, has virtually no 
means to hold the agency accountable, although the public is the primary 
recipient of the agencys actions whether favorable or unfavorable.  
Similarly, shareholders elect directors to make business decisions for the 
corporation, and those directors in turn appoint officers to run the daily 
business of the corporation.  The directors have the ability to remove 
these officers from their positions as well as the legal authority to 
approve certain actions.  The shareholders, however, cannot hold these 
officers accountable, although the shareholders indirectly can do so by 
not re-electing the directors at the next annual meeting. 
B.  Accountability Through Formal, Legal Methods 
As demonstrated in the prior section, informal methods produce 
weak accountability.  Accountability, however, can also be created 
through formal mechanismsthose that are derived from a legal source 
(superimposed fixed rules, regulations or procedures that restrict 
authority or mandate information disclosure).69  Formal accountability 
 66. Bressman, supra note 63, at 48691 (discussing the presidential control model). 
67. Id. at 506. 
 68. Stephan, Accountability, supra note 46, at 684. 
 69. Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 22, at 261. 
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typically occurs through an evaluation conducted by external means, 
such as judicial and quasi-judicial processes,70 and for that reason many 
examples of formal accountability can be found in the law.  Although 
administrative law presents a more complicated authority versus 
accountability dilemma than the modern corporation, others, such as 
disputes involving prisoners and hospital staffing, offer more 
equivalently complicated dilemmas.  The following sections briefly 
describe the authority versus accountability dilemmas presented in each 
of these contexts and explain how those competing interests are balanced 
in each context.  Each section also evaluates whether that context 
presents any insights for shareholder derivative litigation. 
1. Administrative Law 
As noted above, the administrative agencies possess significant 
authority, but are subject to little control because the informal methods of 
accountability are largely ineffective.  Formal accountability also appears 
ineffective in this context because the power of judicial review for 
agency actions is limited.71  Under current laws Chevron standard, 
courts must defer to reasonable administrative statutory interpretations 
that rely upon the incumbent administrations views of wise 
policy . . . .72  Thus, courts largely defer to the agencys policy choice 
when the authority versus accountability dilemma of administrative law 
is presented through litigation, but they do not always do so.73  Similar to 
 70. Keohane & Nye, supra note 20, at 35 ([Accountability] can also be created by rules, 
monitored by independent organizations and by courts.); Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 22, at 261 
(stating that external accountability usually involves evaluation of performance and outcomes by a 
credible external entity (private or public) in the context of predetermined boundaries). 
 71. Bressman, supra note 63, at 516 (discussing the proposition that courts give agencies 
virtually unlimited discretion to choose their procedures for making general policy (citing S.E.C. 
v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947))). 
 72. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
73. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Democratizing the Administrative State, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 559, 60407 (2006) (noting that courts have begun to refuse to defer to agency interpretations 
of ambiguous agency rules where the rules were written in an extraordinarily open-ended manner, 
that courts refuse to defer to an agency interpretation of a rule when that interpretation is announced 
only as a litigating position, and that [c]ourts regularly refuse to defer to agency interpretations of 
ambiguous rules in the context of enforcement proceedings in which agencies seek to impose 
penalties on firms for violating agency rules without adequate advance notice that such conduct 
would violate the rule); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevrons Domain, 89 
GEO. L.J. 833, 915 (2001) (The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that agency interpretations of 
statutes that deviate from the Courts own precedents are not entitled to Chevron deference.); id. at 
836 (arguing that instead of applying Chevron, courts may apply the multi-factoral approach to 
deference embodied in the Courts venerable decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 
140 (1944), which included such contextual factors as the expertise of the agency, the thoroughness 
of the agencys decision, and the agencys consistency with prior interpretations). 
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the corporate context, such deference has been justified on the basis that 
courts lack expertise in such matters.  But administrative law has not 
found a balancing point in judicial review of agencies actions that is 
much different from the current business judgment rule approach to 
reviewing directors actions.  For that reason, administrative law offers 
no new solutions for shareholder derivative litigation. 
2. Prisoner Litigation 
An authority versus accountability dilemma similar to that presented 
in corporations appears in the context of prisoner litigation.  Prisoners 
may seek redress of their grievances through litigation, which necessarily 
interferes with the prison administrations authority to administer their 
prisons and potentially increases the cost of prison administration.  Prior 
to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),74 a prisoners complaint 
could be dismissed for failure to state a claim only if it appears beyond 
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim 
which would entitle him to relief.75  Such a procedure was criticized as 
allowing excessive federal judicial intervention into state prison 
administration and increasing expenses for the states.76  In fact, prior to 
the PLRA, state prisoner litigation accounted for the single largest 
category of civil lawsuits filed in U.S. district courts.77  Further, these 
prisoner lawsuits represented the case type with the lowest plaintiff win 
rate as such plaintiffs were successful in only 1.4% of lawsuits filed.78
The PLRA sought to remedy these problems by mandating that 
inmates cannot initiate a lawsuit for violation of federal law unless they 
first have exhausted such administrative remedies as are available.79
Thus, courts may dismiss such actions when inmates have failed to 
exhaust their administrative remedies.  By mandating that inmates first 
 74. Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801810, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 75. Eugene J. Kuzinski, The End of the Prison Law Firm?: Frivolous Inmate Litigation, 
Judicial Oversight, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 361, 363 (1998) 
(quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 52021 (1972)). 
 76. Brian J. Ostrom et al., Congress, Courts and Corrections: An Empirical Perspective on the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1525, 152526 (2003). 
77. Id. at 1525; see also Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1557 
(2003) (stating that in 1995, inmate lawsuits constituted nearly a fifth of the federal civil docket). 
 78. Ostrom et al., supra note 76, at 1526. 
 79. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000); Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55
DUKE L.J. 437, 485 (2005) (noting that the PLRA was enacted primarily to curtail claims brought 
by prisoners under § 1983 and placed strict limits on prisoners access to federal courts (quoting 
Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752, 755 (3d Cir. 1996))). 
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turn to more immediate and less expensive methods of resolution, there 
is a greater chance that simple disputes may be resolved within the prison 
itself, without involving the judicial process.80  The PLRA also directs 
courts to dismiss inmate claims, either upon the courts own motion or 
that of a party, when the claim is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a 
defendant who is immune from such relief.81  Additionally, new 
pleading standards apply to prisoner lawsuits.82
The PLRA also alters the outcome of a successful prisoner lawsuit.  
[T]he PLRA reforms the prospective and preliminary relief that judges 
may order, establishes findings upon which such relief must be based, 
and sets the permissible length of such relief.83  These revised 
procedures seek to ensure that federal judges will be involved in prison 
affairs for only so long and only as necessary to remedy a 
constitutional violation.84  The court may not grant prospective relief 
unless it is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct 
the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means 
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.85  In doing so, the 
court also must give substantial weight to any adverse impact upon 
public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the 
relief.86
The PLRA achieved its purpose, as forty-three percent fewer 
inmate-initiated complaints were filed in 2001 than in 1995, despite the 
fact that the actual inmate population had increased by twenty-three 
percent in the same time period.87  The PLRAs attempt to lessen 
judicial interference with prison administration, however, has received its 
fair share of criticism for creating the wrong balance between authority 
and accountability.88  Prisoner grievance procedures can be understood 
 80. Kuzinski, supra note 75, at 381. 
81. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)). 
 82. For instance, an inmate cannot file a lawsuit for mental or emotional injury unless they can 
also show physical injury.  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), unconstitutional as applied by Siggers-El v. 
Barlow, 433 F. Supp. 2d 811, 813 (E.D. Mich. 2006). 
 83. Kuzinski, supra note 75, at 376. 
84. Id.
 85. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2000). 
 86. Id.
 87. Geraldine Doetzer, Hard Labor: The Legal Implications of Shackling Female Inmates 
During Pregnancy and Childbirth, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 363, 376 (2008) (citing Margo 
Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, at 155960 (2003)). 
88. See generally Adam Slutsky, Totally Exhausted: Why a Strict Interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 
1997e(a) Unduly Burdens Courts and Prisoners, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2289 (2005); David M. 
Adlerstein, Note, In Need of Correction: The Iron Triangle of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 
101 COLUM. L. REV. 1681 (2001). 
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as creating a balance between three competing goals: (1) prison 
administrators authority to autonomously operate prisons, (2) the 
containment of costs attributable to prison administration, and (3) the 
institution of effective procedural conduits for the protection of 
prisoners rights . . . .89  The PLRA has been criticized as overvalu[ing] 
autonomy and cost control at the expense of prisoners rights,90 or in 
other words, the PLRA overvalues authority at the expense of 
accountability.  One critic proposes that increased transparency of 
grievance procedures would foster greater accountability at modest cost, 
without unduly interfering with the task of prison administration.91
Prisoner litigation does not appear to offer a close analogy to 
corporations.  Prison administrators have absolute authority over 
prisoners, and can only be held accountable through litigation.  Prisoners 
have no other means of holding prison administrators accountable for 
their decisions.  By contrast, directors do not have absolute power over 
corporations.  Shareholders must approve certain corporate actions and 
shareholders can theoretically hold directors accountable through means 
other than litigation.  However, the resolution of the authority versus 
accountability dilemma in prisoner litigation may present some useful 
insights for shareholder derivative litigation.  The authority of prison 
administrators can be challenged only through litigation, but such 
litigation is governed by procedural rules designed to ensure prison 
administrators authority is not disturbed except in egregious 
circumstances and then only after prison administrators first have had the 
opportunity to resolve the problem.  Thus, if the balance of authority and 
accountability needs to be weighted more toward directors authority in 
the context of shareholder derivative litigation, the procedural rules of 
the PLRA may offer methods for doing so. 
3. Hospital Staff Privileges 
Another interesting example of the difficulty of balancing authority 
and accountability can be found in the area of hospital-staffing decisions.  
At first blush, the balance appears to be heavily tilted toward authority, 
because the general rule is that a private hospital may control its staffing 
procedures without court interference in such business decisions.92
 89. Adlerstein, supra note 88, at 1683. 
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1697. 
 92. Katharine Van Tassel, Hospital Peer Review Standards and Due Process: Moving From 
Tort Doctrine Toward Contract Principles Based on Clinical Practice Guidelines, 36 SETON HALL 
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However, an exception exists when the decision involves the revocation, 
suspension, or reduction of existing staff privileges in private hospitals 
that are quasi-public or constitute a virtual monopoly in a particular 
area.93  In such cases, courts must accord great deference to hospitals 
decisions regarding staff privileges, and judicial review is limited to 
factors which are within the expertise of courts.94  Judicial review, 
however, is allowed to determine that the hospital complied with its 
bylaws and to ensure the hospitals bylaws afforded staff basic notice 
and fair hearing procedures.95  Further, a court may review a private 
hospitals actions even where the bylaws have been followed if actual 
unfairness on the part of the hospital, its committees, or individual 
members of the committees has been demonstrated in the record.96  In 
such cases, judicial review of hospital decisions regarding staff 
procedures and privileges has included a determination that the decision 
was made in good faith and on objectively reasonable grounds, the 
decision was consistent with the public interest, and the decision was 
supported by sufficient evidence.97
In sum, the balance in this context appears weighted toward 
accountability, despite statements that the courts may not substitute their 
judgment for that of hospitals, because courts have held that they can 
review staff decisions on such broad notions as good faith, 
reasonableness, unfairness, and sufficient evidence.  Litigation 
challenging hospitals decisions regarding staff privileges resembles 
shareholder derivative litigation challenging directors decisions.  In both 
circumstances, courts have recognized that such decisions are business 
decisions within the defendants discretion and that deference should be 
given to the defendants.  Further, in both contexts, courts can potentially 
exercise broad judicial review, although arguably courts are conducting 
more searching review of hospitals decisions when they review 
decisions regarding staff privileges for objectively reasonable grounds 
consistent with public interest.  If a normative judgment is made that 
judicial review of directors decisions should be broader than current law 
permits, this analogy may offer a way to do so. 
L. REV. 1179, 1215 (2006). 
93. See Kevin M. McKenna, Courts Leave Legislatures to Decide the Fate of the NCAA in 
Providing Due Process, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 77, 113 (1992) (stating an Illinois exception to 
the rule of non-review where a hospital must follow its own bylaws when revoking or reducing 
staff privileges or be subject to limited judicial review).  
94. See Van Tassel, supra note 92, at 1201. 
 95. 41 C.J.S. Hospitals § 32 (2008). 
 96. Adkins v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Ctr., 544 N.E.2d 733, 738 (Ill. 1989). 
 97. 41 C.J.S. Hospitals § 32 (2008). 
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III. BALANCING AUTHORITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN SHAREHOLDER 
DERIVATIVE LITIGATION
Shareholder derivative litigation constitutes the formal method of 
accountability in the corporate context.  In that context, the business 
judgment rule currently functions as the mechanism that balances 
directors authority against shareholders right to hold directors 
accountable.  In corporate law, authority and accountability are 
competing powers that are in tension, because more of one means less of 
the other.98  Nobel laureate economist Kenneth Arrow described the crux 
of this authority versus accountability dilemma when he explained that 
the power to hold to account is ultimately the power to decide.99  This 
idea has led a corporate scholar to argue that efforts to hold the board 
accountable necessarily shift some of the boards decision-making 
authority to shareholders or judges.100  Correspondingly, efforts to 
insulate the board from legal liability necessarily increase the boards 
authority while decreasing shareholders ability to hold directors 
accountable.  The question is how best to balance authority and 
accountability within the context of shareholder derivative litigation.  
Section A explains the current formulation of the business judgment rule 
in balancing authority and accountability in such litigation.  Section B 
then examines proposals to shift the balance toward accountability, while 
Section C analyzes proposals to shift the balance toward authority. 
A. The Business Judgment Rule 
The business judgment rule is one of the most controversial and least 
understood doctrines of corporate law.101  It has received extensive 
 98. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 86, 108.  The tension between authority and accountability 
can be seen not only in the director primacy model, but also in the shareholder primacy model of 
corporate governance.  See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder 
Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 875 (2005) (advocating for more accountability); Jill E. Fisch, 
Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 662
63 (2006) (discussing fiduciary duties as a method of accountability); Henry Hansmann & Reinier 
Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 441, 44449 (2001) 
(discussing the shareholder primacy model, as well as the manager-oriented model, the labor-
oriented model, and the state-oriented model). 
 99. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 103, 108 (citing KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF 
ORGANIZATION 78 (1974)). 
100. Id. at 10304. 
101. See S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 93 
(1979) (stating the business judgment rule is misunderstood); Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 8384 
(Countless cases invoke it and countless scholars have analyzed it.  Yet, despite all of the attention 
lavished on it, the business judgment rule remains poorly understood.); Douglas M. Branson, 
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debate among scholars, practitioners, and judges as to its proper 
formulation and application.102  Yet no satisfying framework for 
understanding and applying the business judgment rule has developed.103
The business judgment rule has existed in American corporate law 
for almost two centuries.104  Developed through common law, it 
generally protects directors from liability for their decisions when 
challenged by shareholders through derivative litigation.  Judges and 
scholars have advanced many rationales for the business judgment rule: 
preventing shareholders from second-guessing directors decisions with 
the benefit of hindsight, 105 protecting directors from liability for honest 
mistakes of judgment or unpopular business decisions,106 encouraging 
directors to take calculated business risks,107 providing protection to 
Lecture, The Rule That Isnt A RuleThe Business Judgment Rule, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 631 
(2002) (stating the business judgment rule is much misunderstood); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, 
Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439, 454 (2005) (Mannes 
statement about the rule remains as true in 2005 as when first made in 1967: the business judgment 
rule is one of the least understood concepts in the entire corporate field.); Henry G. Manne, Our 
Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 270 (1967) (stating the 
business judgment rule is one of the least understood concepts in the entire corporate field). 
102. See, e.g., Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Once More, the Business Judgment Rule, 2000 WIS. L.
REV. 573, 573 (2000) (noting that thousands of pages of corporate law scholarship and commentary 
have been devoted to [the business judgment rule], yet we remain short of any broad consensus as to 
[its rationale]); Johnson, supra note 101, at 454 (recognizing that there is deep rooted 
disagreement about the basic purpose and thrust of the business judgment rule and the degree of 
deference that courts . . . should accord director judgments); Dana M. Muir & Cindy A. Schipani, 
Fiduciary Constraints: Correlating Obligation with Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 697, 726 
(2007) (stating that confusion of the business judgment rule stems from the issue of whether [the 
Rule] is simply a doctrine that prevents courts from second-guessing good faith business decisions or 
whether it is a standard of care); Bernard S. Sharfman, Being Informed Does Matter: Fine Tuning 
Gross Negligence Twenty Plus Years After Van Gorkom, 62 BUS. LAW. 135, 143 (2006) (stating the 
business judgment rule is a misunderstood legal doctrine because of the inability to appreciate the 
mechanics of the rule). 
103. See Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided 
Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 287, 28788 (1994) (stating that [a]t first glance, the general concept 
behind the [business judgment] rule seems unassailable but that a problem occurs when courts and 
writers attempt to inject specific content into this general propositionimmediately, a lack of 
consensus emerges as to what the rule really is). 
104. See Arsht, supra note 101, at 93 (dating the business judgment rule to at least the early 
1800s). 
105. See A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 4.01 cmt. d (1994) (stating the business judgment rule protects directors from the risks inherent in 
hindsight reviews of their unsuccessful decisions and avoids stifling innovation and venturesome 
business activity). 
 106. Arsht, supra note 101, at 96; see also Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 11314 (Business 
decisions rarely involve black-and-white issues; instead, they typically involve prudential judgments 
among a number of plausible alternatives.  Given the vagaries of business, moreover, even carefully 
made choices among such alternatives may turn out badly.). 
107. See Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 110 (stating that encouraging risk taking is a justification 
for the business judgment rule); Branson, supra note 101, at 632 (stating the business judgment rule 
is built upon economic freedom and the encouragement of informed risk taking); see also Muir & 
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ensure that individuals will be willing to serve as directors,108 and 
recognizing that directors are better-suited than courts to make business 
decisions.109  The real difficulty lies not in understanding why the 
business judgment rule exists, but in determining how courts should 
apply the protections of the business judgment rule. 
Under any formulation of the business judgment rule, it operates as a 
defense asserted in shareholder derivative actions that challenge a 
decision made by a corporations board of directors.110  Procedurally, 
defendants have been allowed to assert their business judgment defense 
on a motion to dismiss, a motion for summary judgment, and at trial.111
To understand how courts decide whether the business judgment defense 
should protect the directors decision, one must look to the Delaware 
courts, which are the undisputed leaders in the development of corporate 
common law now112 and for the foreseeable future.113
In recent years, Delaware courts have consistently articulated that the 
business judgment rule operates as a presumption that directors have 
Schipani, supra note 102, at 726 (arguing that without the business judgment rule, directors would 
approve only low-risk projects even when high-risk projects may be better decisions).
108. See Arsht, supra note 101, at 97 (The business judgment rule grew principally from the 
judicial concern that persons of reason, intellect, and integrity would not serve as directors if the law 
exacted from them a degree of prescience not possessed by people of ordinary knowledge.); R. 
Franklin Balotti & Mark J. Gentile, Commentary from the Bar, Elimination or Limitation of Director 
Liability for Delaware Corporations, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 5, 9 (1987) (The general result has been 
that many qualified individuals have refused to serve as directors.); Muir & Schipani, supra note 
102, at 726 (arguing that without the business judgment rule, corporations would have problems 
attracting qualified members to serve on boards). 
109. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (The judges are not 
business experts.); Branson, supra note 101, at 637 (stating courts are ill-equipped to review 
business decisions because they often involve intangibles, intuitive insights or surmises as to 
business matters such as competitive outlook, cost structure, and economic and industry trends and 
are not susceptible to systematic analysis). 
110. See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006). 
111. See In re BHC Commcns, Inc. Sholder Litig., 789 A.2d 1, 4 (Del. Ch. 2001) ([I]t is a 
bedrock principle of Delaware corporate law that, where a claim for breach of fiduciary duty fails to 
contain allegations of fact that, if true, would rebut the presumption of the business judgment rule, 
that claim should ordinarily be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).); Weinberger v. United Fin. Corp. of 
Cal., No. 5915 (1979), 1983 WL 20290, at *6 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 1983) (noting that to defeat a 
summary judgment motion, plaintiff can allude to facts in the record which are undisputed or which 
are disputed but, if true, are sufficient to rebut the presumption of the business judgment rule); In re 
The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch. 2005) (holding defendants were 
entitled to business judgment rule protection after a lengthy trial). 
112. See William H. Rehnquist, The Prominence of the Delaware Court of Chancery in the 
State-Federal Joint Venture of Providing Justice, 48 BUS. LAW. 351, 354 (1992) (describing 
Delawares preeminence in corporate law); see also Veasey, supra note 1, at 443 (Delaware law is 
the default repository for the rich and comprehensive common law of fiduciary duty of 
directors . . . .). 
113. See Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for 
Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 106164 (2000). 
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acted in accordance with their fiduciary duties in making decisions for 
the corporation.114  The plaintiff-shareholders may rebut that 
presumption by showing that the defendant-directors violated any one of 
their fiduciary duties or by showing that the business judgment rule is 
inapplicable because the defendant-directors committed an act of fraud, 
illegality, or waste.115  If the plaintiff-shareholders fail to rebut the 
presumption, then the business judgment rule protects the defendant-
directors from liability for their decision.116  On the other hand, if the 
plaintiff-shareholders show a breach of a fiduciary duty or show fraud, 
illegality, or waste, then the presumption of the business judgment rule is 
rebutted and the defendant-directors must prove that the challenged 
transaction was entirely fair to the corporation and its shareholders.117
Even this statement of the current formulation of the business judgment 
rule does not present a complete explanation.  As this author has argued 
elsewhere, the Delaware courts now apply stricter scrutiny to directors 
pre-trial assertions of the business judgment rule defense in shareholder 
derivative actions, although without explicitly altering the current 
formulation of that defense.118
114. See In re Walt Disney, 906 A.2d at 52 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 
1984)) (Our law presumes that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted 
on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best 
interests of the company.  Those presumptions can be rebutted if the plaintiff shows that the 
directors breached their fiduciary duty of care or loyalty or acted in bad faith.  If that is shown, the 
burden then shifts to the director defendants to demonstrate that the challenged act or transaction 
was entirely fair to the corporation and its shareholders.); see also McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 
910, 917 (Del. 2000) (Procedurally, the initial burden is on the shareholder plaintiff to rebut the 
presumption of the business judgment rule.  To meet that burden, the shareholder plaintiff must 
effectively provide evidence that the defendant board of directors, in reaching its challenged 
decision, breached any one of its triad of fiduciary duties, loyalty, good faith or due care.  
Substantively, if the shareholder plaintiff fails to meet that evidentiary burden, the business 
judgment rule attaches and operates to protect the individual director-defendants from personal 
liability for making the board decision at issue.).  But see R. Franklin Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., 
Rejudging the Business Judgment Rule, 48 BUS. LAW. 1337, 1345 (1993) (arguing the business 
judgment rule is not a presumption in the strict evidentiary sense of the term). 
115. See In re Walt Disney, 906 A.2d at 7375 (analyzing an allegation of waste separately from 
the alleged breaches of fiduciary duties); see also Paglin v. Saztec Intl, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 1184, 
1200 (W.D. Mo. 1993) (noting [t]he business judgment rule does not apply when the act 
complained of is ultra vires, illegal, or fraudulent); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 779 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1968) (The directors are chosen to pass upon [questions of policy and business 
management] and their judgment unless shown to be tainted with fraud is accepted as final. 
(quoting Davis v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 142 A. 654 (Del. Ch. 1928))); Kamin v. Am. Express 
Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 81011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (noting courts will not substitute their 
judgment for that of directors absent fraud, dishonesty, or nonfeasance). 
 116. Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989). 
117. In re Walt Disney, 906 A.2d at 52; Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 9091 (Del. 
2001); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 
805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
118. See Scarlett, supra note 3, at 60309. 
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B. Shifting the Balance Toward Accountability 
Scholars have made several proposals that would alter shareholder 
derivative litigation by shifting the balance more toward accountability.  
Perhaps the most dramatic example is Professor Gevurtzs proposal to 
abolish the business judgment rule.119  He reviewed the various 
formulations that courts have given to the business judgment rule over 
time, and concluded that the business judgment rules various meanings 
could be broken into two categories.120  He characterized the first 
category as meaningless because it is simply saying that directors will 
not be liable for their decisions unless there is a reason for holding them 
liable, such as if they breach their duties of care or loyalty.121  He called 
the second category misguided because it establishes a special standard 
of liabilitygross negligencefor alleged duty of care breaches that 
differs from typical tort law.122  Professor Gevurtz concluded that courts 
should apply the ordinary negligence standard to review directors 
actions,123 because directors should be held to the same rules of 
negligence as everyone else.124  Thus, he advocated for the abolition of 
the business judgment rule, because it is a phrase of limited utility and 
much potential for mischief.125  Another scholar has advocated 
abolishing the business judgment rule in the tender offer context.126
Taking a slightly different tact, other scholars advocate for broader 
judicial review of directors decisions through various expansions of the 
fiduciary duties which thereby alter the application of the business 
judgment rule.  For instance, some scholars assert that directors owe a 
fiduciary duty of good faith and that a breach of that duty should 
 119. Gevurtz, supra note 103, at 28789 (This Article therefore concludes that the rule should 
be abolished and directors be required to live with the same rules of negligence as everyone else.). 
120. Id. at 290. 
121. Id. at 28991. 
122. Id. at 289, 295303 (identifying the misguided category as including three standards 
taken by courts and commentators: (1) the good faith standard, which focuses on directors 
subjective motivations; (2) the gross negligence standard, which entails some worse level of 
dereliction than ordinary negligence; and (3) the process-versus-substance distinction, which 
calls for more scrutiny of process and limits, but does not eliminate judicial scrutiny of the 
decisions merits). 
123. Id. at 33637. 
124. Id. at 289. 
125. Id. at 33637 (advocating for abolishing the business judgment rule and holding directors to 
the typical negligence standards); id. at 337 (stating that the business judgment rule is a rule 
which corporate law would well do without). 
 126. Matthew Taylor, Tender Offers and the Business Judgment Rule, 7 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 
171, 190 (1998) (proposing that the business judgment rule be abolished in the tender offer context). 
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overcome the business judgment rule presumption.127  Because of the 
nature of good faith, courts reviewing allegations that directors breached 
that duty must necessarily look into the subjective intentions of 
directors.128  Correspondingly, courts likely cannot decide whether 
directors have breached a duty of good faith on a motion to dismiss or a 
motion for summary judgment, because such a decision necessarily 
entails a review of the facts.  The Delaware Supreme Court recently has 
suggested that directors may owe at least a limited duty of good faith and 
that directors acts of bad faith may rebut the business judgment rule 
presumption in some circumstances.129
Some scholars similarly advocate for broader judicial review by 
proposing an expansion of the duty of loyalty.  Under current common 
law, directors must be disinterested and independent in voting on 
transactions.130  However, courts have traditionally accepted only 
familial relationships as destroying a directors independence,131 holding 
that [a]llegations of mere personal friendship or a mere outside business 
relationship, standing alone, are insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt 
about a directors independence.132  For example, allegations that 
127. See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Delawares Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 48384 
(2004). 
 128. Gevurtz, supra note 103, at 297. 
129. Compare In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52, 63 (Del. 2006) 
(Those presumptions can be rebutted if the plaintiff shows that the directors breached their 
fiduciary [duties] or acted in bad faith.), with Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 36970 (Del. 2006) (a 
showing of bad faith conduct . . . is essential to establish director oversight liability); see Scarlett, 
supra note 3, at 61922 (discussing In re Walt Disney and Stone v. Ritter).
130. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 362 (Del. 1993); see also Schoon v. 
Smith, 953 A.2d 196, 207 (Del. 2008) (The requirement of director independence [inheres] in the 
conception and rationale of the business judgment rule. . . . Independence means that a directors 
decision is based on the corporate merits of the subject before the board rather than extraneous 
considerations or influences. (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984), overruled 
on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000))); Orman v. Cullman, 794 
A.2d 5, 22 (Del. Ch. 2002) (stating the business judgment rule is rebutted where a majority of the 
directors either were interested in the outcome of the transaction or lacked the independence to 
consider objectively whether the transaction was in the best interest of its company and all of its 
shareholders). 
131. See, e.g., Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 264 (Del. 2002) (noting that while a 
director may be controlled in multiple ways, independence focuses on familial or close personal 
relationships). 
 132. Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050 (Del. 2004); Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. 
Turner, 846 A.2d 963, 98081 (Del. Ch. 2000) (finding allegation that a director was controlled by 
another director because of their 15-year professional and personal relationship was insufficient to 
raise a reasonable doubt as to independence); Benerofe v. Cha, No. 14614, 1998 WL 83081, at *3 
(Del. Ch. Feb. 20, 1998) (finding conclusory allegations of long-standing friendship is not enough to 
raise a reasonable doubt that a director could exercise his independent business judgment); In re 
Grace Energy Corp. Sholders Litig., No. 12,464, 1992 WL 145001, at *4 (Del. Ch. June 26, 1992) 
([T]he Delaware Supreme Court has made it clear that conclusory allegations of such personal 
affinity alone are not sufficient to establish director interest.  Actual financial interest must be 
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Martha Stewart and other directors moved in the same social circles, 
attended the same weddings, developed business relationships before 
joining the board, and described each other as friends, even when 
coupled with Stewarts 94% voting power, [were] insufficient, without 
more, to rebut the presumption of independence.133  Similarly, alleging 
that a director is controlled or dominated by another director almost 
never succeeds in court.134  Criticizing such reasoning, some scholars 
argue that courts should apply a broader notion of independence when 
reviewing alleged breaches of the duty of loyalty.135  Similar to the duty 
of good faith, however, such expansion of the duty of loyalty would 
likely require a more fact-intensive review of the subjective relationships 
between directors. 
Finally, others advocate for changes to judicial review of alleged 
violations of the duty of care.  For instance, some endorse courts 
substantive review of directors decisions.136  Although courts frequently 
state that they review only the process and procedures used by directors 
in making a decision,137 some court opinions arguably permit review of 
the substance of directors decisions.  For instance, some opinions state 
that courts may review directors decisions for rationality or 
irrationality.138  A due care analysis that allows a merit-based review 
shown.). 
133. Beam, 845 A.2d at 1051 (analyzing the directors independence and the business judgment 
rules applicability in the context of deciding whether demand was excused).
134. See Branson, supra note 101, at 642 (A plaintiff making [a dominated director case] faces 
an uphill battle.  Courts are loathe to find that an otherwise reputable business person is not his or 
her own person.); see also Beam, 845 A.2d at 1052 (To create a reasonable doubt about an outside 
directors independence, a plaintiff must plead facts that would support the inference that because of 
the nature of a relationship or additional circumstances other than the interested directors stock 
ownership or voting power, the non-interested director would be more willing to risk his or her 
reputation than risk the relationship with the interested director.). 
135. See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors 
Fiduciary Duty through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393 (2005); Julian Velasco, Structural 
Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 821 (2004). 
136. See, e.g., Julian Velasco, Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 605 
(2007); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and Officers, 51 U. PITT. L.
REV. 945 (1990). 
137. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 26264 (Del. 2000) (holding the business judgment 
rule requires process due care); see also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 87488 (Del. 1985) 
(reviewing the process by which the directors made their decision), superseded by statute as stated 
in  Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85 (Del. 2001); Underbrink v. Warrior Energy Servs. Corp., 
No. 2982-VCP, 2008 WL 2262316, at *10 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2008) (Courts give deference to 
directors decisions reached by a proper process, and do not apply an objective reasonableness test in 
such a case to examine the wisdom of the decision itself. (quoting Brazen v. Bell Atl. Corp., 695 
A.2d 43, 49 (Del. 1997))). 
138. See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 74 (Del. 2006); see also 
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (Irrationality is the outer limit of the business 
judgment rule.); AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 n.9 (Del. 
08.0_SCARLETT FINAL 10/25/2008 11:49:21 AM 
64 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57 
presents an obvious opportunity for shareholders and courts to second-
guess directors decisions with the benefit of hindsight bias.  Further, 
allowing a substantive review of directors decisions almost guarantees 
that courts will find a factual question as to whether the duty of care was 
breached, which will prevent dismissal or summary judgment.  Some 
scholars urge a slightly different alteration of the duty of care, advocating 
for courts to review alleged breaches of the duty of care under the typical 
ordinary negligence standard rather than the gross negligence 
standard used by some courts.139  Lowering the standard to ordinary 
negligence would likely make it easier for shareholders to overcome the 
business judgment rule presumption, as the gross negligence standard 
implies a greater degree of negligence is required to overcome that 
presumption. 
Professor Gevurtzs 1994 proposal to abolish the business judgment 
rule has gone nowhere.  And although proposals to broaden judicial 
review through expansion of the fiduciary duties abound, they have yet 
to gain any traction in the courts or legislatures.  These proposals, 
however, signal that more, not less, accountability is sought by many 
scholars and perhaps by shareholders. 
C. Shifting the Balance Toward Authority 
By contrast, the balance between authority and accountability could 
be weighted toward authority.  The most extreme example would likely 
be a proposal to eliminate shareholder derivative litigation altogether.  
Because shareholders have other methods of holding directors 
accountable, such as the informal accountability mechanisms discussed 
in Part II.A., one could argue that eliminating (or even lessening) the 
accountability available through shareholder derivative litigation does 
not harm shareholders overall.  No scholar, however, has advocated 
completely eliminating shareholder derivative litigation, although some  
Ch. 1986) ([A] decision by disinterested directors following a deliberative process may still be the 
basis for liability if such decision cannot be attributed to any rational business purpose, . . . or is 
egregious. (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) and Aronson v. 
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 (Del. 2004))). 
139. See, e.g., Gevurtz, supra note 103, at 289 (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 
(Del. 1985) as representative, because the court stated that the directors may be held liable for 
breaching their duty of care if the plaintiff shows that the directors were grossly negligent in 
failing to inform themselves of all material information reasonably available to them); Philip C. 
Sorensen, Discretion and Its LimitsAn Analytical Framework for Understanding and Applying the 
Duty of Care to Corporate Directors (and Others), 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 553 (1988). 
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have advocated that such disputes could be resolved through quasi-
judicial means such as arbitration rather than through the courts.140
Giving directors complete control and then making it impossible to 
sanction them seems dangerous.  After all, as the old adage says, 
absolute power corrupts absolutely.141  Even a corporate scholar 
advocating that the balance should be shifted more toward authority 
recognizes that unaccountable authority is likely to make unnecessary 
errors and that unaccountable authority may be exercised 
opportunistically.142  That opportunism includes not only intentional 
self-dealing, but also forms of shirking such as negligence, 
oversight, incapacity, and even honest mistakes.143  Thus, litigation still 
presents an important accountability mechanism for shareholders. 
Yet the current formulation of the business judgment rule has been 
criticized for treating the business judgment rule as a substantive 
doctrine, expressing the scope of director liability, and permitting courts 
some room to examine the substantive merits of the boards decision.144
Because the current approach permits the business judgment rule to be 
rebutted if the plaintiff can show a breach of the duty of due care, one 
critic argues it puts the cart before the horse, because [d]irectors who 
violate their duty of care do not get the protections of the business 
judgment rule.145  Some critics also argue that the current business 
judgment rule approach merely assigns to the plaintiff the burden of 
establishing a prima facie casethe same burden the plaintiff bears in all 
civil litigation.146  In other words, the current approach makes the rule 
140. See Andrew J. Sockol, Comment, A Natural Evolution: Compulsory Arbitration of 
Shareholder Derivative Suits in Publicly Traded Corporations, 77 TUL. L. REV. 1095, 1108 (2003); 
see also Scott R. Haiber, The Economics of Arbitrating Shareholder Derivative Actions, 4 DEPAUL 
BUS. L.J. 85, 85 (1991). 
 141. Letter from John Emerich Edward Dalberg Acton to Bishop Mandell Creighton (1887), 
http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/288200.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2008). 
 142. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 107. 
143. Id. at 108. 
144. Id. at 87; see also id. at 102 (arguing that the current approach expands the scope of judicial 
review by encouraging judges to evaluate not only the directors decision-making process but also 
the substance of the directors decision). 
145. Id. at 9495.  In other words, the whole point of the business judgment rule is to prevent 
courts from even asking the question: did the board breach its duty of care?  Id. at 95; see also id. at 
100 (One does not rebut the business judgment rule by showing a breach of the duty of care; if the 
business judgment rule applies, the court will not review the directors conduct to see if that duty 
was violated.). 
146. Id. at 100; see also Gevurtz, supra note 103, at 292 (This presumption entails nothing 
more than saying that the plaintiff who challenges a decision of the board has the burden of proving 
that the directors breached one of their duties.  Yet, the proposition that the plaintiff, in any context, 
has the burden of proving his or her prima facie case is a rule with which every first-year law student 
should be familiar.). 
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nothing more than a restatement of the principle that a defendant is 
entitled to summary judgment when the plaintiff fails to prove his prima 
facie case.147  One scholar hypothesizes that the current approach allows 
more shareholder derivative actions to overcome motions to dismiss,148
and thus the number of such actions that are initiated will increase as will 
the potential settlement value of those actions.149  Despite these 
criticisms, the Delaware Supreme Court has reaffirmed the current 
formulation of the business judgment rule.150
Professor Bainbridge has recently advocated for shifting the balance 
more toward authority, by proposing that courts view the business 
judgment rule as a doctrine of abstention.151  This proposal has gained 
momentum as other corporate scholars have endorsed the proposed 
abstention approach to the business judgment rule,152 and others have 
urged a similar non-review approach.153  However, no one has critically 
 147. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 101 (If the plaintiff fails to carry that burden, the business 
judgment rule requires the court to dismiss the lawsuit without inquiry into the merits of the 
decision.). 
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52, 7375 (Del. 2006); 
In re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d 346, 363 (Del. Ch. 2008); Underbrink v. Warrior 
Energy Servs. Corp., No. 2982-VCP, 2008 WL 2262316, at *10 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2008). 
 151. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 87. 
152. See Andrew S. Gold, A Decision Theory Approach to the Business Judgment Rule: 
Reflections on Disney, Good Faith, and Judicial Uncertainty, 66 MD. L. REV. 398, 401 (2007) 
(adopting the abstention theory and noting that in practice the business judgment rule carves out a 
large swath of director conduct which is unreviewable by the judicial system, unless plaintiffs can 
demonstrate a conflict of interest or that the boards conduct is so irrational that it could not have 
been motivated by a legitimate business purpose); Steven E. Seward, A World of Evergreen Fees?  
In re Pan American Hospital and Evergreen Retainers in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 60 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 399, 401 (2006) (stating the business judgment rule is a doctrine of abstention, preventing 
courts from inquiring into the wisdom of a boards decision-making, provided the board complies 
with basic procedural requirements); Jeremy Telman, The Business Judgment Rule, Disclosure, and 
Executive Compensation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 829, 83033 (2007) (advocating that the business 
judgment rule be aggressively conceived as a doctrine of abstention and application of the rule be 
limited to cases where disclosure of the decision-making process involved in the challenged 
business decision would require disclosure of prospective business plans); id. at 832 (stating the 
abstention doctrine is [t]he most compelling explanation of how the Rule ought to be 
conceptualized as it protects corporations from suits challenging substantive decisions that are 
within the scope of board control); see also Elizabeth A. Nowicki, A Directors Good Faith, 55 
BUFF. L. REV. 457, 534 (2007) (referring to a presumption of judicial abstention from substantive 
review of directors decisions); Fred W. Triem, Judicial Schizophrenia In Corporate Law: 
Confusing the Standard of Care with the Business Judgment Rule, 24 ALASKA L. REV. 23, 27 (2007) 
(stating the business judgment rule supplies judicial restraint and abstention and furnishes a 
deferential standard of review by which courts will abstain from second guessing the directors 
business decisions). 
153. See Branson, supra note 101, at 631 (arguing the business judgment rule should be a 
standard of non-review); Sharfman, supra note 102, at 145 (arguing the business judgment rule is 
not a standard of liability, but rather a standard of non-review). 
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analyzed Professor Bainbridges proposal nor examined its actual 
application in shareholder derivative litigation.  Following Section 1s 
explanation of the proposed abstention approach to the business 
judgment rule, Section 2 will remedy that deficit. 
1. An Abstention Approach to the Business Judgment Rule 
As framed by Professor Bainbridge, the [business judgment] rule is 
better understood as a doctrine of abstention pursuant to which courts in 
fact refrain from reviewing board decisions unless exacting preconditions 
for review are satisfied.154  The key underlying assumption for Professor 
Bainbridges proposal is that the courts current approach to the business 
judgment rule inadequately respects the value of directors authority
meaning directors decision-making power.155
According to Professor Bainbridge, corporate decision-making 
efficiency can be ensured only by preventing the boards decision-
making authority from being trumped by courts under the guise of 
judicial review.156  In his opinion, courts must not lightly interfere with 
management or the boards decision-making authority in the name of 
accountability.157  He claims that such abstention would protect 
directors from the risk of hindsight review of their decisions and avoid 
the risk of stifling risk-taking.158  He also justifies his abstention 
approach by claiming that judges are not business experts,159 and that 
judicial review can interfere with the internal team governance 
structures that govern board behavior by destroying key interpersonal 
relationships vital to the boards decision-making.160
Professor Bainbridge argues the business judgment rule should be 
viewed as a doctrine of abstention establishing a presumption against 
judicial review of duty of care claims.161  Under his approach, courts will 
 154. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 87; see also id. at 129 ([E]xcept to verify that the relevant 
preconditions for review are not met, courts should simply abstain from reviewing operational 
decisions.). 
155. Id. at 85. 
156. Id.  This viewpoint arises from Professor Bainbridges director primacy theory, which 
posits that the board of directors is not an agent of the shareholders but rather, the board is the 
embodiment of the corporate principal, serving as the nexus of the various contracts making up the 
corporation.  Id. at 8586. 
157. Id. at 109.
158. Id. at 110 (citing AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 cmt. D (1994)). 
159. See id. at 11719 (quoting Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919)). 
160. Id. at 12426. 
161. Id. at 109. 
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begin with a presumption against review and evaluate the decision-
making process instead of the quality of the decision.162  Thus, courts 
following this abstention approach will abstain from reviewing the 
substantive merits of the directors conduct unless the plaintiff can 
satisfy rigorous preconditions for review.163  Professor Bainbridge 
contends that if the business judgment rule is framed as a doctrine of 
abstention, judicial review will be the exception as opposed to the rule.164
Likewise, he claims that the abstention approach ensures that the null 
hypothesis is deference to the boards authority.165  He believes that his 
proposal offers a more objective approach because, when certain 
preconditions for review are not satisfied, courts will abstain from 
reviewing operational decisions.166  He states that abstention in 
operational decisions is appropriate since most such decisions do not 
create any tension between directors and shareholders interests.167
Professor Bainbridge suggests that an abstention approach to the 
business judgment rule has a long pedigree in American law.168  He 
cites the 1968 case of Shlensky v. Wrigley,169 as a classic expression of 
the business judgment rule as a doctrine of abstention.170  William 
Shlensky, a minority shareholder in the corporation that owned the 
Chicago Cubs and operated Wrigley Field, brought a shareholder 
derivative action alleging the corporation was losing money due to poor 
attendance at home games, which he argued was attributable to the 
boards decision not to install lights at Wrigley Field and thus not to 
schedule night games.171  Shlensky alleged that the directors violated 
their duty of care by disregarding the effect their decision had on the 
corporations finances and by making their decision based not on the 
corporations best interests, but rather on their personal view that 
baseball was a daytime sport.172  The defendants argued that the court 
should not interfere with the directors honest business judgment unless 
the plaintiff shows fraud, illegality, or conflict of interest.173  Adopting 
162. See id. at 128. 
163. Id. at 87.
164. Id. at 127. 
165. Id. at 109. 
166. Id. at 129. 
167. See id. at 12930. 
168. Id. at 9798. 
 169. 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). 
 170. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 87. 
 171. Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 77778. 
172. Id. at 778. 
173. Id.
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this approach, the court refrained from evaluating the directors decision 
because it found that the decision was one properly before the directors 
and the motives alleged by the plaintiff evidenced no fraud, illegality, or 
conflict of interest in the decision.174  Professor Bainbridge also points to 
several other cases as examples of the abstention approach to the 
business judgment rule,175 including the recent Brehm v. Eisner,176 which 
he says was not as pure an abstention decision as was Shlensky, but 
notes that none of the preconditions set forth by [the Delaware Supreme 
Court in Brehm] contemplate substantive review of the merits of the 
boards decision.177
2. The Flaws in an Abstention Approach to the Business Judgment 
Rule 
Given limited liability and diversification, Professor Bainbridge 
believes shareholders would prefer judicial abstention to judicial 
review.178  He argues that shareholders will tolerate risk-taking while 
directors will be opposed to risk-taking if they face legal liability on top 
of economic loss in the event a risky decision turns out badly.179
However, it is not clear that shareholders are willing to accept less 
accountability than they currently possess in shareholder derivative 
litigation.  Post-Enron evidence suggests that shareholders are not.  
Shareholder proposals have achieved majority votes on initiatives such 
as eliminating staggered boards, separating the CEO position from the 
chairman of the board position, and limiting executive pay, all of which 
are designed to prevent directors and officers from becoming entrenched 
or promoting their own self-interests.180  Shareholder proposals also have 
attempted to eliminate poison pills, which make companies more 
resistant to takeover bids.181  In some instances, shareholder proposals 
have proven unnecessary because directors and management acceded to 
 174. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 9697 (citing Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 780). 
175. Id. at 98 (citing Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) and Kamin v. 
Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 81011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976)). 
 176. 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
 177. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 100 (citing Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264 & n.66). 
178. See id. at 11016. 
179. See id.
180. See Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way?  The Erosion of the 
Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INTL L.J. 493, 52728 (2005) 
(discussing the 2003 proxy season). 
 181. Thomas Kostigen, Shareholder Activism Is Turning into Profits for Investors, THOMSON 
FINANCIAL NEWS, June 15, 2007. 
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the shareholders demands.182  Shareholders also are impacting corporate 
decision-making on such issues as environmental standards and labor 
rights.183
Even if Professor Bainbridge were correct in his assumptions that 
shareholders would prefer judicial abstention and that courts are not 
giving sufficient deference to directors decisions under the current 
formulation of the business judgment rule, his proposed abstention 
approach does not offer the ideal solution.  As described in Section a, the 
proposed abstention approach will not significantly alter shareholder 
derivative lawsuits, because it operates essentially the same in the 
context of litigation as the current formulation of the business judgment 
rule and otherwise is too limited to be useful as a replacement for the 
current formulation.  In addition, Section b explains that courts are 
unlikely to adopt the proposed abstention doctrine approach to the 
business judgment rule, because it does not fit within the abstention 
doctrines commonly recognized by courts and abstention otherwise does 
not present a desirable approach. 
a. An Abstention Approach Operates the Same in Litigation as the 
Current Approach to the Business Judgment Rule 
The proposed abstention approach to the business judgment rule does 
not function differently in practice than the current formulation of the 
business judgment rule.  The current formulation views the business 
judgment rule as a presumption protecting directors decisions, and that 
the presumption is rebuttable by plaintiffs in certain ways.  Under the 
proposed abstention approach, courts begin with a presumption against 
review and will abstain from reviewing the substantive merits of the 
directors conduct unless the plaintiff can carry the very heavy burden of 
rebutting that presumption.184  Thus, both the current approach and the 
182. See Robert C. Illig, What Hedge Funds Can Teach Corporate America: A Roadmap for 
Achieving Institutional Investor Oversight, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 225, 26061 (2007) (noting in 2006 
that management at forty-five of forty-six companies that held a vote on shareholder proposals to 
eliminate staggered boards supported the change and that evidence showing that forty-four percent 
of shareholder proposals were withdrawn before the annual meeting suggested that many were 
mooted by management assent); see also Alistair Barr, Settlement Fever Grips Companies as Proxy 
Season Looms, THOMSON FINANCIAL NEWS, Mar. 4, 2006 (reporting in 2006 that more companies 
were settling with activist shareholders to avoid potentially damaging and embarrassing proxy 
contests at annual meetings). 
 183. Kostigen, supra note 181. 
 184. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 87 (citing Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1968)); see also id. at 90 (stating that the business judgment rule should establish a presumption 
against judicial review of duty of care claims, such that a court abstains from reviewing the 
substantive merits of the directors conduct unless the plaintiff can rebut the business judgment 
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proposed abstention approach establish a presumption of non-review, 
and courts will not review the challenged conduct unless the plaintiff can 
rebut that presumption. 
In addition, the methods for rebutting the presumption of the 
business judgment rule are similar under both the proposed abstention 
approach and the current formulation.  [T]he abstention conception 
contemplates . . . that, if the requisite preconditions are satisfied, there is 
no remaining scope for judicial review of the substantive merits of the 
boards decision.185  Those preconditions include that the directors made 
a conscious decision, that the directors conduct does not involve fraud 
or self-dealing, and that the directors acted in good faith with 
disinterested independence.186  Under current law, if the directors did not 
make a conscious decision to act or refrain from acting, then there is 
nothing to which the business judgment rule may apply because it 
applies only to scenarios involving a business judgment.187  Similarly, if 
plaintiff presents evidence of fraud or bad faith by the directors, then 
current law indicates that the business judgment rule presumption has 
been rebutted.188  Also, under the current formulation, plaintiffs may 
rebut the business judgment rule presumption by showing a breach of the 
duty of loyalty,189 which requires that directors be disinterested in 
making decisions for the corporation, or in other words refrain from self-
rules presumption of good faith). 
185. Id. at 99; see also id. at 129 (arguing courts should abstain from reviewing directors 
decisions except to verify that the relevant preconditions for review are not met); id. at 87 (stating 
that courts should refrain from reviewing board decisions unless exacting preconditions for review 
are satisfied). 
186. Id. at 99. 
 187. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. 
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (noting the business judgment rule does not apply where directors 
have either abdicated their functions, or absent a conscious decision, failed to act); see also id. 
([A] conscious decision to refrain from acting may . . . be a valid exercise of business judgment and 
enjoy the protections of the rule.); Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 547 A.2d 963, 972 (Del. 
Ch. 1986) (The business judgment rule may apply to a deliberate decision not to act . . . .); Kaplan 
v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971) (Application of the rule of necessity depends 
upon a showing that informed directors did, in fact, make a business judgment authorizing the 
transaction under review.). 
188. See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006) (stating that 
the business judgment rule presumption can be rebutted if the plaintiff shows that the directors 
breached their fiduciary duty of care or loyalty or acted in bad faith); see also Paglin v. Saztec Intl 
Inc., 834 F. Supp. 1184, 1200 (W.D. Mo. 1993) (noting the business judgment rule does not apply 
when the act complained of is ultra vires, illegal or fraudulent); Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 
N.Y.S.2d 807, 81011 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (noting courts will not substitute their judgment for that 
of directors absent fraud, dishonesty, or nonfeasance); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 779 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (The directors are chosen to pass upon [questions of policy and business 
management] and their judgment unless shown to be tainted with fraud is accepted as final. 
(quoting Davis v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 142 A. 654, 659 (Del. Ch. 1928))). 
189. See cases cited supra note 188. 
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dealing, and that directors exercise independence in making those 
decisions.190  Moreover, both approaches limit courts to reviewing the 
decision-making process and not the merits of the decision.191  In sum, 
under both the current formulation and the proposed abstention approach, 
courts will refrain from reviewing board decisions unless similar 
conditions for review are satisfied.192
Furthermore, both approaches operate the same after the court 
determines whether the presumption of the business judgment rule has 
been rebutted.  Under the current approach, if the plaintiff fails to rebut 
the presumption, then the business judgment rule protects the directors 
from liability and the case ends.193  Similarly, under the proposed 
abstention approach, if the court determines that the exacting 
preconditions for review have not been satisfied, then the court abstains 
from further review.194  On the other hand, if the plaintiff rebuts the 
presumption of the business judgment rule under either the current 
approach or the proposed abstention approach, the case proceeds.195
The abstention approach leaves open the possibility of intervention 
in appropriate circumstances,196 meaning when the exacting 
preconditions for review are satisfied.  Professor Bainbridge, however, 
believes that judicial review is more likely to be the exception rather than 
190. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 362 (Del. 1993) (stating a director must 
make decisions independently based on the merits of the transaction and must be disinterested in the 
outcome); see also Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 22 (Del. Ch. 2002) (stating the business 
judgment rule is rebutted where a majority of the directors either were interested in the outcome of 
the transaction or lacked the independence to consider objectively whether the transaction was in the 
best interest of its company and all of its shareholders). 
191. See Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 128 (stating that under his abstention approach, [t]he 
court begins with a presumption against review.  It then reviews the facts to determine not the 
quality of the decision, but rather whether the decision-making process was tainted by self-dealing 
and the like.); see also Muir & Schipani, supra note 102, at 726 (stating that courts focus on the 
duty of care analysis rather than on the substantive decision, and that courts have been reluctant 
to second-guess good faith business decisions). 
 192. Professor Bainbridges listing of the preconditions for review does not include the duty of 
care.  However, he specifically states that he would exempt duty of care cases involving structural 
issues from his proposed abstention doctrine.  Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 129. Professor 
Bainbridge also does not mention illegality or waste, so it is unclear how he would treat cases 
involving such allegations. 
 193. Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989). 
 194. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 87. 
 195. Presumably, at this point, the case continues the same under current law and under the 
proposed abstention approach because Professor Bainbridge does not state any different 
consequence than the current approach, which requires the directors to prove that the challenged 
transaction was fair to the corporation and its shareholders.  In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative 
Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 2006); Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 9091 (Del. 2001); 
Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361; Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other 
grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
 196. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 127. 
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the norm under his proposed abstention approach.197  The current 
formulation also establishes a presumption of non-review, but 
intervention is possible if the plaintiffs can meet their burden of rebutting 
that presumption.  Perhaps the abstention approach raises the bar 
established by the presumption, but it seems to reflect only a difference 
in semantics.198  Indeed, Professor Bainbridge appears to recognize that 
the abstention approach does not provide any clearer framework for 
applying the business judgment rule: 
The question is not whether the directors violated some bright-line 
precept, but whether their conduct satisfied some standard for judicial 
abstention.  The greater flexibility inherent in standards frequently 
comes into play in business judgment rule jurisprudence as courts fine 
tune the doctrines application to the facts at bar.  Much of that fine 
tuning can be explained as an unconscious attempt to strike an 
appropriate balance between authority and accountability under specific 
factual circumstances.  The principal law reform implication of this 
analysis thus may be that courts ought to be more explicit both about 
the fact that they are balancing competing concerns and about why they 
believe the balance struck in a particular case is the appropriate one.199
The proposed abstention approach is simply not that different from the 
current approach, and therefore presents courts with no compelling 
reason to adopt it. 
Finally, the proposed abstention doctrine appears too limited to be 
useful as a replacement for the current formulation of the business 
judgment rule.  Because the abstention approach would not prohibit court 
review in cases alleging fraud or breaches of the duties of loyalty or good 
faith,200 it is designed to apply only to a small category of business 
judgment rule casesthose alleging a breach of the fiduciary duty of 
care.  The abstention approach, however, is limited further to apply only 
to duty of care cases involving operational issues, such as whether to 
install lighting in a baseball park201 because such decisions do not pose 
much of a conflict between the interests of directors and shareholders.202
197. Id. at 12728. 
198. Cf. Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate 
Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 1 (2005) (arguing that good faith functions as a rhetorical 
device rather than a substantive standard). 
 199. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 12829. 
 200. Professor Bainbridge does not include waste or illegality, but presumably the abstention 
approach would not prohibit court review of waste or illegality, which are typically treated the same 
as fraud by courts and scholars. 
 201. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 129. 
202. Id.
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The proposed abstention approach exempts any duty of care case that 
challenges a decision regarding structural issues, such as takeovers or 
mergers.203
In addition, a new approach limited to a portion of the duty of care 
cases appears unnecessary because directors rarely face legal liability for 
violations of the duty of care.204  Under the exculpatory statutes found in 
all fifty states, corporations possess the power to enact bylaw provisions 
limiting or eliminating director liability for breaches of the duty of 
care.205  These statutes mean that directors will not be held financially 
liable for breaching their duty of care, and also that directors may obtain 
dismissal of lawsuits in which only monetary damages for an alleged 
duty of care violation are sought.206  Thus, the duty of care is relevant 
only for those cases seeking solely injunctive relief for an alleged duty of 
care breach and those corporations that have not adopted exculpatory 
provisions, although such corporations may carry insurance that will 
effectively eliminate directors financial liability.207  Furthermore, the 
number of cases actually finding a violation of the duty of care is 
extremely small.208
203. Id.
204. See Muir & Schipani, supra note 102, at 726 (stating that courts focus on the duty of care 
analysis rather than on the substantive decision, and that courts have been reluctant to second guess 
good faith business decisions). 
205. See Fairfax, supra note 135, at 412 (citing J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State 
Corporate Law in the Governance of Public Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 332 n.93 (2004)) 
(noting all fifty states had statutes enabling corporations to limit or eliminate personal liability for 
directors for breaches of the duty of care by 2003).  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) 
(2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(4) (West 2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(4) (West 
2008). 
206. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 91 (Del. 2001) ([A]doption of charter 
provision . . . bars recovery of monetary damages from directors for a successful shareholder claim 
that is based exclusively upon establishing a violation of the duty of care.); Malpiede v. Townson, 
780 A.2d 1075, 109596 (Del. 2001) ([A] Section 102(b)(7) charter provision bars a claim that is 
found to state only a due care violation.). 
 207. Fairfax, supra note 135, at 414 (noting that [t]he combination of indemnification 
provisions and [directors and officers] insurance essentially eliminates directors financial liability 
for breaching their fiduciary obligations). 
208. See Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Directors Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of 
Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591, 591 n.12 
(1983) (noting only seven cases holding directors liable for all breaches of fiduciary duty other than 
self-interested transactions); see also In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 
750 (Del. Ch. 2005) ([D]uty of care violations are rarely found.); Fairfax, supra note 135, at 407
08 (Over the last twenty years, a variety of mechanisms have contributed to a virtual elimination of 
legal liability for directors who breach their duty of care under state law.); Mark J. Loewenstein, 
The Quiet Transformation of Corporate Law, 57 SMU L. REV. 353, 369 (2004) (Van Gorkom is 
famous, of course, because it marked one of the few times that a court found directors liable for 
breach of the duty of care.). 
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The proposed abstention approach could potentially be different 
from the current formulation of the business judgment rule if it 
eliminated director liability for any breach of the duty of care.  At times, 
Professor Bainbridge appears close to suggesting that courts abstain from 
reviewing all claims alleging that directors breached their duty of care 
and, in many ways, such a proposal would be the most defensible option.  
In the end, though, Professor Bainbridge does not advocate eliminating 
liability for all duty of care claims.209  Further, assuming courts are not 
providing sufficient deference to directors decisions in business 
judgment rule cases, an approach focused solely on the duty of care is 
simply too limited to be useful. 
b. Courts Are Unlikely to Adopt an Abstention Approach to the 
Business Judgment Rule 
The proposed doctrine of abstention differs significantly from the 
abstention doctrines commonly applied by judges and litigators.  Under 
the four primary abstention doctrines210known as Pullman,211
Burford,212 Younger,213 and Colorado River214 abstention, after the major 
 209. Professor Bainbridges proposal may exempt duty of care cases involving structural issues 
due to a concern about potential conflicts of interest between the board and the shareholders in final 
period decisions, such as mergers and sales.  To that extent, such an exemption is unnecessary 
because such concerns already are encompassed within the duty of loyalty and thus exempt under his 
proposed abstention doctrine. 
 210. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52, at 325 (6th 
ed. 2002) (These various doctrines overlap at times, and the courts have not always distinguished 
them clearly.). 
 211. The Pullman abstention doctrine allows a federal court to avoid decision of a federal 
constitutional question when the case may be disposed of on questions of state law.  Id.; R.R. 
Commn of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 50102 (1941); see also WRIGHT & KANE, supra 
note 210, § 52, at 326 (stating that the state court decides the state issues, and the federal court 
avoids deciding a federal constitutional question prematurely or unnecessarily, since if the state court 
should hold the order unauthorized as a matter of state law, there will be no need for the federal 
court to pass on the federal [constitutional] question).  The state law must be fairly subject to an 
interpretation which will render unnecessary or substantially modify the federal constitutional 
question.  Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Natl Union, 442 U.S. 289, 306 (1979) (quoting Harman 
v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 53435 (1965)); WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 210, § 52, at 326 (noting 
also that Pullman abstention will not be ordered if the state law is clear on its face, or if its meaning 
has already been authoritatively decided by the state courts, or if the constitutional issue would not 
be avoided or changed no matter how the [state law] is construed). 
 212. The Burford abstention doctrine allows a court to dismiss a case in order to avoid needless 
conflict with a states administration of its own affairs.  WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 210, § 52, at 
325, 330; Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 31718 (1943); see also New Orleans Pub. Serv., 
Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989) (Where timely and adequate state-court 
review is available, a federal court sitting in equity must decline to interfere with the proceedings or 
orders of state administrative agencies: (1) when there are difficult questions of state law bearing on 
policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the case then 
at bar; or (2) where the exercise of federal review of the question in a case and in similar cases 
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Supreme Court cases recognizing themfederal courts may dismiss or 
stay actions pending before them in certain circumstances even though 
the courts have jurisdiction under the Constitution and federal statute.215
All of these abstention doctrines represent a sorting of the relationship 
between state and federal courts, and reflect a complex of 
considerations designed to soften the tensions inherent in a system that 
contemplates parallel judicial processes.216  Thus the purpose of these 
abstention doctrines is to preserve the balance between state and federal 
sovereignty.217  The proposed doctrine of abstention for the business 
judgment rule does not fit that overarching rationale.218  Applying an 
abstention approach to the business judgment rule does not soften the 
tensions in the relationship between state and federal courts, or the 
would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of 
substantial public concern.). 
 213. The Younger abstention doctrine requires federal courts to refrain from hearing 
constitutional challenges to state action under circumstances in which federal action is regarded as 
an improper intrusion on the right of a state to enforce its laws in its courts.  WRIGHT & KANE, 
supra note 210, § 52A, at 34142; Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 4346 (1971) (holding that a 
federal court should not enjoin a prior state criminal prosecution except when necessary to prevent 
immediate irreparable injury).  The Younger abstention doctrine has since been expanded to quasi-
criminal cases, quasi-judicial proceedings, and to civil proceedings.  William A. Calhoun, II, 
Comment, Arthur Millers Death of a Doctrine or Will the Federal Courts Abstain from Abstaining?  
The Complex Litigation Recommendations Impact on the Abstention Doctrines, 1995 BYU L. REV.
961, 974 (1995); Mathew D. Staver, The Abstention Doctrines: Balancing Comity with Federal 
Court Intervention, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 1102, 112125 (1998). 
 214. The Colorado River abstention doctrine avoids duplicate litigation by allowing a federal 
court to stay or dismiss an action on the ground that a similar action is pending in state court in 
which the controversy between the parties can be resolved.  WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 210, § 
52, at 325, 338; Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818 (1976).  
Although the pendency of a state court action does not prohibit an action regarding the same matter 
in federal court, dismissal in such circumstances may be permissible in some exceptional cases.  
Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 818 (listing four factors as relevant in deciding whether exceptional 
circumstances exist: (1) assumption by the state court of jurisdiction over any property, (2) any 
contention that the federal forum is less convenient to the parties than the state forum, (3) avoidance 
of piecemeal litigation, and (4) the order in which jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent 
forums); see also Moses H. Cone Meml Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 26 (1983) 
(adding two additional factors: (1) whether federal law provides the rule of decision on the merits 
because the presence of federal-law issues must always be a major consideration weighing against 
surrender and (2) the probable inadequacy of the state-court proceedings to protect [the litigants] 
rights). 
 215. WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 210, § 52, at 325. 
 216. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 n.9 (1987). 
 217. Staver, supra note 213, at 1153; WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 210, § 52, at 327 (stating that 
Pullman abstention is necessary to satisfy the principles of federalism); Calhoun, supra note 213, at 
97174 (noting that federalism concerns constituted the Supreme Courts rationale for the Burford 
and Younger abstention doctrines). 
 218. In addition, these recognized state/federal abstention doctrines are criticized on numerous 
grounds, including that they impose unnecessary cost, delay and uncertainty, and also that they 
represent judicial usurpation of legislative authority.  See Leonard Birdsong, Comity and Our 
Federalism in the Twenty-First Century: The Abstention Doctrines Will Always Be with UsGet 
Over It!!, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 375, 38387 (2003). 
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relationship between separate sovereigns.219  Rather, the tension in such 
cases is in the purely private relationship between directors and 
shareholders.  For this reason, courts are unlikely to adopt an abstention 
doctrine approach to the business judgment rule. 
A lesser known and lesser cited abstention doctrine, however, is 
potentially analogous to the proposed abstention approach to the business 
judgment rule: the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.220  The 
ecclesiastical abstention doctrine states that courts must not review an 
issue that is strictly and purely ecclesiastical in its character . . . which 
concerns theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical 
government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the 
standard of morals required of them . . . .221  The rationale behind this 
 219. Using the rationale of the Colorado River abstention doctrine, some courts have recognized 
an international abstention doctrine, which may apply when parallel cases are pending in domestic 
and international courts.  See, e.g., Turner Entmt Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1518 
(11th Cir. 1994); Andrés Rivero et al., A Comity of Errors: Understanding the International 
Abstention Doctrine, 17 FLA. J. INTL L. 405, 409 (2005) (discussing the Second Circuits 
recognition of an international abstention doctrine).  The Supreme Court also has recognized a tribal 
abstention doctrine, also known as the tribal exhaustion doctrine, which requires a federal court to 
abstain from exercising its concurrent jurisdiction until tribal court remedies have been exhausted.  
Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16, n.8 (1987) (stating that for reasons analogous to 
principles of abstention, a federal district court must stay its hand in order to give the tribal court a 
full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction. (quoting Natl Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow 
Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 857 (1985))); see also Blake A. Watson, The Curious Case of 
Disappearing Federal Jurisdiction over Federal Enforcement of Federal Law: A Vehicle for 
Reassessment of the Tribal Exhaustion/Abstention Doctrine, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 531 (1996). 
 220. Scholars also have gleaned a similar academic abstention doctrine, which states that courts 
should not interfere in the relationship between a school and its students or faculty when the dispute 
is academic in nature.  See, e.g., David L. Dagley & Carole A. Veir, Subverting the Academic 
Abstention Doctrine in Teacher Evaluation: How School Reform Legislation Defeats Itself, 2002 
BYU EDUC. & L.J. 123, 124 (2002) ([A] court will abstain from interfering with decisions of school 
officials and school boards unless the decision represents an abuse of discretion, is irrational, or 
violates constitutional or statutory rights.); Steven G. Olswang, Academic Abstention Stronger than 
Ever, Despite Vaksman, 26 J.L. & EDUC. 91 (1997).  The Supreme Court has articulated the view 
that universities can best perform their missions when they are free from governmental or judicial 
interference.  See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985) (When 
judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision . . . they should show 
great respect for the facultys professional judgment.  Plainly, they may not override it unless it is 
such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or 
committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment.).  Board of Curators of 
Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90 (1978) (Like the decision of an individual professor as 
to the proper grade for a student in his course, the determination of whether to dismiss a student for 
academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of cumulative information and is not readily adapted 
to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking.).  It applies to decisions on 
such matters as student admissions, grading, dismissals, faculty hiring, and award of tenure.  
Terrence Leas, Higher Education, the Courts, and the Doctrine of Academic Abstention, 20 J.L. &
EDUC. 135 (1991). 
 221. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 73334 (1871) (holding that a state court was bound by an 
ecclesiastic tribunals decision regarding whether anti-slavery or pro-slavery supporters in a local 
Presbyterian church were entitled to control the church property); see also Serbian E. Orthodox 
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form of abstention is that a church is a voluntary organization and the 
members that join the church consent to the churchs authority to make 
determinations about their status as members.222  For the members 
consent to be meaningful and for them to have assurance that those with 
competence in ecclesiastical matters will resolve ecclesiastical disputes, 
courts must abstain from interfering in such matters.223
However, the Supreme Court has not issued a blanket abstention 
doctrine for ecclesiastical matters.  The Supreme Court has stated that 
ecclesiastical tribunals may function independently in determining 
disputes within their proper sphere of governance, but when such 
tribunals violate personal or property rights, their determinations are 
subject to judicial review.224  It also has given courts permission to 
conduct a limited review of ecclesiastical decisions for fraud, collusion, 
or arbitrariness.225
Thus, under the ecclesiastic abstention doctrine, the Supreme Court 
has decided that courts should not interfere in the relationship between 
the church and its members when the dispute is ecclesiastical in nature.  
Analogously, one could argue that courts should not interfere in the 
relationship between a corporations board of directors and its 
Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976) (For where resolution of the 
disputes cannot be made without extensive inquiry by civil courts into religious law and polity, the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments mandate that civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of the 
highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a church of hierarchical polity, but must accept such decisions 
as binding on them, in their application to the religious issues of doctrine or polity before them.). 
222. Cf. Watson, 80 U.S. at 72829 (All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an 
implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it.). 
223. Id.; John S. Brennan, The First Amendment Is Not the 8th Sacrament: Exorcizing the 
Ecclesiastical Abstention Doctrine Defense from Legal and Equitable Claims for Sexual Abuse 
Based on Negligent Supervision or Hiring of Clergy, 5 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 243, 
260 (2002) (stating that where the ecclesiastical decision involves an internal dispute between 
parties that have voluntarily subjected themselves to church authority, where the dispute involves a 
question of discipline, faith, ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law, and where the decision does not 
result in a violation of morality, property or infringe on personal rights, civil courts must accept them 
as binding in their application to the case before them). 
224. See Watson, 80 U.S. at 728 (In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious 
belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine which does not violate 
the laws of morality and property, and which does not infringe personal rights, is conceded to all.); 
id. at 73233 (stating that courts would not be bound by an ecclesiastical tribunals decision that a 
man is guilty of murder nor by an ecclesiastical tribunals resolution of property rights between 
church members when the dispute does not depend on a religious question). 
 225. Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929) (In the absence 
of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters purely 
ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as 
conclusive, because the parties in interest made them so by contract or otherwise.); see also 
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 712 (stating that although Watson had left civil courts no role to play in 
reviewing ecclesiastical decisions . . . Gonzalez first adverted to the possibility of marginal civil 
court review when such decisions are challenged as products of fraud, collusion, or 
arbitrariness (quoting Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 447 (1969))).
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shareholders when the dispute is business in nature.  However, in reality 
it is not so simple to determine the disputes from which courts should 
abstain, and courts have not applied the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine 
consistently or easily.226  Thus, the question of when courts should 
abstain from resolving disputes between directors and shareholders will 
prove no easier to answer in the corporate context than when it is in the 
ecclesiastical arena.  Indeed, the same problem exists in applying the 
current business judgment rule formulation to real-world disputes 
between shareholders and directors. 
In addition, for all of these recognized abstention doctrines, the 
Supreme Court has made it clear that abstention is the extraordinary 
exception and not the rule.227  Professor Bainbridges proposed 
abstention doctrine reverses that principal.  Under his proposed 
abstention doctrine approach to the business judgment rule, abstention 
would be the rule and judicial review would be the extraordinary 
exception.228  Moreover, under the proposed abstention approach, the 
court must review the decision to see if the plaintiff has met the 
preconditions for review, which seems to suggest more judicial review 
than occurs in these recognized abstention doctrines.  For all these 
reasons, courts are unlikely to adopt an abstention approach to the 
business judgment rule and the Delaware Supreme Court has arguably 
rejected Professor Bainbridges abstention approach by reaffirming the 
 226. Brennan, supra note 223, at 268 (Yet courts faced with such disputes have not acted 
consistently in applying the doctrine.  To some extent, this is because not enough focus has been 
placed on the doctrines limitations: First, the doctrine should apply only when the litigants are 
members of the church who have consented to being governed and bound by church authority on the 
issue in question.  Second, the doctrine applies to matters that are ecclesiastical in character such as 
theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the 
members of the church to a moral standard.  If ecclesiastical conduct can be reviewed without the 
need to review such issues, the court may determine its legal effect in the context of the dispute 
before it.  Third, the ecclesiastical decision cannot violate the laws of morality and property or 
infringe on personal rights.). 
 227. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976) 
(Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule.  The doctrine of 
abstention, under which a District Court may decline to exercise or postpone the exercise of its 
jurisdiction, is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a 
controversy properly before it.  Abdication of the obligation to decide cases can be justified under 
this doctrine only in the exceptional circumstances where the order to the parties to repair to the state 
court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest. (quoting County of Allegheny v. 
Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 18889 (1959))).  The Supreme Court continues to cite this same 
language from Colorado River in more recent opinions.  See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
517 U.S. 706, 728 (1996); Moses H. Cone Meml Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 14 
(1983). 
 228. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 12728 (If the business judgment rule is framed as an 
abstention doctrine, however, judicial review is more likely to be the exception rather than the 
rule.). 
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current formulation of the business judgment rule.229  Indeed, Professor 
Bainbridge complained as much on his website after the Delaware 
Supreme Court issued its Disney opinion.230
Professor Bainbridges proposed doctrine of abstention may simply 
be suggesting that courts give more deference to directors, as opposed 
to attempting to draw an analogy to abstention as that term is 
understood by litigators and judges.  Alternatively, Professor 
Bainbridges proposal could be read as suggesting courts should possess 
less discretion when ruling on assertions of the business judgment 
defense.  Either way, as explained in the preceding section, the proposed 
abstention approach does not present an effective alternative to the 
current business judgment rule formulation. 
IV. A BETTER APPROACH FOR BALANCING AUTHORITY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
None of the existing proposals for the business judgment rule, as 
outlined in Part III, have settled the debate as to the proper balancing of 
authority and accountability in shareholder derivative litigation.  So the 
question remains: is there a better approach for balancing authority and 
accountability in shareholder derivative litigation?  As shown in Part II, 
the balancing of authority and accountability occurs throughout the law, 
and the appropriate balance point can differ depending on a variety of 
factors such as the complexity of the area of law and policy 
considerations.  Such balancing can occur through procedural or 
substantive mechanisms, or some combination of both, in the context of 
litigation. 
Regardless of ones viewpoint as to the proper balancing of authority 
and accountability in the corporate context, a potential for abuse arises 
from the procedures surrounding the courts current application of the 
business judgment rule.  Indeed, those procedures may contribute to the 
critics perception that courts are not providing sufficient deference to 
directors decisions.  Currently, defendants may assert the business 
judgment defense in pretrial dispositive motions, such as motions to 
229. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52, 7375 (Del. 2006). 
 230. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Disney: Jacobs on the BJR, Business Associations Blog (June 8, 
2006), http://www.businessassociationsblog.com/lawandbusiness/comments/disney_jacobs_on_the_ 
bjr (last visited Oct. 5, 2008) (quoting the Disney opinions explanation of the current business 
judgment rule formulation and stating: Sigh.  I inveighed against precisely this formulation in my 
article The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine.  Its very disappointing to see such a 
perceptive and thoughtful jurist as [Delaware Supreme Court Justice] Jacobs perpetuate this 
misconception.). 
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dismiss or motions for summary judgment, and at trial,231 but courts are 
not required to render a final decision as to the applicability of the 
business judgment rule until trial.  Only when the court grants a pretrial 
dispositive motion asserting the business judgment defense, does it 
render a final judgment on the issue.232  For example, if the court rules 
that the business judgment rule applies at the motion to dismiss stage, the 
court abstains from further review and the case ends without any 
discovery being taken and without a trial 
On the other hand, when a court denies motions to dismiss or 
motions for summary judgment asserting the business judgment rule 
defense, it is not a final resolution of the applicability of that defense as it 
can be reasserted and reevaluated at any point up to and including trial.233
This process destroys at least some of the business judgment rules value, 
because it likely allows discovery and perhaps a trial in which the court 
may ultimately rule that the directors decision is protected by the 
business judgment defense.234  Directors are not receiving the intended 
benefit of the business judgment defense when they are forced to go 
through discovery and trial before the court makes its final decision that 
the directors are entitled to the protection of the business judgment 
defense.  Similarly, the non-plaintiff shareholders and the corporation 
suffer to the extent that corporate resources were devoted to such 
fruitless litigation.  Importantly, this procedural problem pertains to all 
types of business judgment rule cases, not just the duty of care cases that 
scholars frequently criticize. 
Section A analyzes the benefits of a procedural mechanism versus a 
substantive mechanism for balancing authority and accountability in the 
corporate context.  Having recognized the potential advantages of a 
procedural mechanism, Section B then explains that the qualified 
immunity doctrine offers a procedural approach for the business 
judgment rule that better balances authority and accountability in 
shareholder derivative litigation. 
231. See cases cited supra note 111. 
232. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1291; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 74446 
(1976) (concluding that only final decisions of a district court are appealable, except under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292). 
233. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 697, 754, 75759 (Del. Ch. 
2005) (holding defendants were entitled to business judgment rule protection after a lengthy trial, 
after having denied motions to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment asserting the business 
judgment rule defense). 
234. See Scarlett, supra note 3, 60306. 
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A. Procedural Versus Substantive Mechanisms for Balancing Authority 
and Accountability in Shareholder Derivative Litigation 
Assuming that shareholders should continue to possess the right to 
hold directors accountable for their decisions through shareholder 
derivative litigation, at least in certain circumstances, then the question is 
how should courts apply the business judgment rule to balance authority 
and accountability in such cases.  Although the business judgment 
defense could be abolished, such a radical proposal has not been adopted 
by any court or legislative body.  Thus, this Article assumes that the 
business judgment rule will continue to be the mechanism that balances 
authority and accountability in shareholder derivative litigation, and 
proposes a new approach to the business judgment defense that could be 
adopted either through courts further development of common law or 
through statutory enactments. 
Applying the business judgment rule in litigation will never be an 
entirely objective endeavor.  Although called a rule, the business 
judgment rule is universally recognized as a standard.235  That standard 
must be applied to the facts of a pending case, and thus applying the 
business judgment rule will always involve a subjective component.  
Recognizing that the business judgment defense is a standard, not a rule, 
a new approach to the business judgment defense requires the 
development of a standard that will guide courts in deciding whether the 
business judgment defense should apply in a particular case.  A standard, 
alone, will not eliminate potential errors in the subjective application of 
those standards.  However, as noted in Part II, a standard combined with 
transparency, such as that provided by reasoned court opinions, may 
provide enhanced consistency and predictability in the application of the 
business judgment defense, which is necessary for that formulation to 
function properly over time.  Combining these two aspects, standards and 
transparency, fit two common accountability mechanisms: 
(1) enhanced structure for decision-makers, which limits their authority 
and discretion ex ante through guidelines and standards, yielding more 
consistent decision-making across cases, and (2) transparency with 
respect to the actions of decision-makers and the outcomes of their  
 235. Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 128 ([T]he business judgment rule clearly is misnamed; it is 
a standard, not a rule.); Branson, supra note 101, at 631 (noting the business judgment rule has no 
mandatory content, involves no substantive dos or donts for corporate directors or officers, 
and entail[s] only slight review of business decisions). 
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decisions, thereby permitting ex post monitoring in light of the 
established guidelines, which, in turn, serve as criteria for evaluation.236
Thus, that standard will provide directors with guidance on how to 
conduct their activities so as to obtain the protections of the business 
judgment rule.  It also will help shareholders and their attorneys predict 
the likely outcome of potential litigation, which may allow shareholders 
to maintain a method of accountability over boards of directors while 
preventing frivolous shareholder litigation.  Transparency will also 
enable higher courts, legislatures, and the public to monitor trial courts 
application and enforcement of the standard. 
The business judgment standard could be implemented as a 
procedural or a substantive mechanism.  At times, the business judgment 
rule has been seen as substantive and other times procedural.237
Although in theory it does not matter whether the business judgment 
defense is expressed as a procedural mechanism or a substantive 
mechanism, it does make a practical difference in litigation.  It 
determines when the decision is made as to whether the business 
judgment rule applies to protect the directors from liability.  It also 
potentially alters who makes the decision as to whether the business 
judgment rule applies.  In addition, it affects the complexity of the 
standard that may guide the decision maker in determining if the 
business judgment rule applies.  It may even affect the frequency with 
which the business judgment rule is deemed to protect directors 
decisions. 
If the business judgment rule is seen as a procedural mechanism for 
balancing authority and accountability, the judge would decide whether 
the business judgment rule applies and likely could do so on a pretrial 
dispositive motion.  Thus, the decision could occur early in the litigation 
before discovery occurs.238  If a preliminary decision could be made by a 
court to assess the likelihood of the shareholders success on the 
meritsovercoming the business judgment defensethen significant 
amounts of time and money could be saved to the benefit of the 
corporation, the directors, and all the shareholders.  Further, the decision 
 236. Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 22, at 260. 
237. Compare Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000); Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 
N.Y.S.2d 807, 810-11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976), affd, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); 
Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 
668, 684 (Mich. 1919), with In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 52 (Del. 
2006); and Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993), decision modified, 636 
A.2d 956 (Del. 1994). 
 238. Stoner v. Walsh, 772 F. Supp. 790, 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating mere allegations of 
director impropriety do not entitle a plaintiff to discovery). 
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could be based on a defined standard with little judicial discretion, and 
thus presumably without a searching review of the boards decision.  For 
instance, if the court determined that the board made a decision, acted 
within its authority, and acted without any conflict of interest, then the 
court could defer to the boards authority and review the boards decision 
no further.  With a procedural mechanism, one would predict that the 
balance would tip in favor of authority. 
If the business judgment rule is seen as a substantive mechanism for 
balancing authority and accountability, then one would predict that the 
balance would tip more toward accountability as the decision maker must 
evaluate the substance of the decision.  With a substantive standard, the 
decision could be made by a judge or a jury.  Whoever the decision 
maker, the decision would occur later in litigation and likely after 
discovery because a substantive standard requires the weighing of facts 
as developed through discovery.  Inevitably, it is a more discretionary 
standard, allowing a more searching review of the boards decision.  If 
the decision is made after discovery, more intrusion into the boards 
decision-making process will occur and likely more disruption of the 
boards operations will be experienced.  Also, it will be more expensive 
for directors, the corporation, and ultimately all the shareholders.  
Further, a substantive mechanism yields a fact-based decision, which 
makes appellate review more complicated and also makes it more 
difficult for the public and legislatures to monitor its application and 
enforcement.  In addition, it is more challenging for directors to regulate 
their conduct ex ante to avoid litigation with a substantive standard. 
For these reasons, implementing the business judgment rule by 
procedural mechanism appears to be the better choice.  As seen in Part 
II.B.2., the PLRA uses procedural rules to prohibit prison administrators 
authority from being disturbed by frequent litigation and to effectively 
limit such litigation to truly egregious cases.  First, the PLRA requires 
plaintiffs to exhaust all administrative remedies before initiating a 
lawsuit.  Second, it requires courts to dismiss claims that are frivolous, 
malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  
Third, it imposes heightened pleading standards.  Finally, it limits the 
relief that judges may order, establishes the findings upon which relief 
must be based, and sets the length of such relief.  Some of the PLRA 
procedures could be adapted to the business judgment defense, such as 
heightened pleading requirements and the limitations on remedies.239  In 
 239. This author elsewhere has advocated for heightened pleading standards for shareholder 
derivative actions.  Scarlett, supra note 3, at 63738. 
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fact, the PLRAs exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement is 
already present in the demand requirement in shareholder derivative 
litigation.240
The PLRA, however, does not present an ideal analogy for 
shareholder derivative litigation because the authority versus 
accountability dilemma in prisoner litigation is quite different from 
shareholder litigation.  As explained in Part II.B.2., prison administrators 
hold absolute authority over prisoners and litigation is the only means by 
which prisoners can attempt to hold prison administrators accountable.  
By contrast, directors do not possess absolute authority in the corporate 
context and litigation is not a shareholders sole method of 
accountability.  For this reason, the qualified immunity defense, which 
utilizes procedures similar to the PLRA, may present a more useful 
analogy for shareholder derivative litigation. 
B. The Qualified Immunity Defense 
The qualified immunity defense shields government officials from 
liability for civil damages in certain circumstances.  The original 
formulation of the qualified immunity defense depended on both 
objective and subjective factors: what the official reasonably knew at the 
time of his action; whether the official had a good faith belief that he was 
acting in accordance with constitutional requirements; and whether the 
official intended to do other injury to the [plaintiff].241  This 
formulation sought to balance the interests of government officials and 
the potential public victims of their conduct.242  But the substantive 
portion of the qualified immunity defense often required resolution of 
factual disputes surrounding the defendants intent in taking the allegedly 
unconstitutional action.243  Similarly, when the parties contested what 
actions the defendant took, then discovery was necessary to resolve the 
 240. In most states and in federal court, a shareholder must make a demand on the board of 
directors before filing a shareholder derivative action on behalf of the corporation.  See, e.g., DEL.
CH. CT. R. 23.1; FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1.  Thus, the board may be given an opportunity to rectify a 
challenged decision before litigation is commenced, but the demand requirement will be excused if 
futile and a boards wrongful rejection of a demand will not prohibit shareholder derivative 
litigation.  See Scarlett, supra note 3, at 59697. 
 241. Diana Hassel, Living a Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity, 64 MO. L. REV. 123, 129 
(1999); see also Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 237 (2006) 
(noting that the original formulation of the qualified immunity defense included both a subjective 
and objective component). 
 242. Hassel, supra note 241, at 129. 
243. Id. at 130; see also Engle v. Townsley, 49 F.3d 1321, 1323 (8th Cir. 1995) (describing the 
issues of material fact that may prevent summary judgment on a qualified immunity defense).
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qualified immunity issue.244  Thus, it was almost impossible for 
defendants to get dismissal on the qualified immunity defense before 
trial.245  This delay in the resolution of the lawsuit was perceived to be 
unfair to defendants as it embroiled them in potentially meritless and 
lengthy litigation.246
The Supreme Court eventually reformulated the qualified immunity 
defense consistent with its original purposes to protect government 
officials who acted reasonably from frivolous lawsuits and to provide 
damages for plaintiffs when a government officials conduct was 
particularly blameworthy.247  In doing so, the Supreme Court moved 
from a primarily substantive test to a more objective test using 
procedural mechanisms to preserve the value of the qualified immunity 
defense.  The Supreme Court was apparently concerned that under the 
prior formulation, government officials would be punished unfairly when 
conducting their duties in good faith and might not vigorously fulfill 
their duties for fear of liability.248  Thus, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,249 the 
Supreme Court eliminated the subjective requirement of good faith from 
the qualified immunity defense and articulated a new formulation of the 
defense.  Pursuant to this new formulation, the Supreme Court held that 
government officials performing discretionary functions generally are 
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not 
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.250  This new formulation 
appears to balance competing interests; to punish only the truly guilty, 
not just the hapless; to provide a remedy to the worthy plaintiff; to 
protect the judicial system from being logjammed with frivolous claims;  
244. See DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 795 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 245. Chen, supra note 241, at 238 (The Court claimed that the subjective component made it 
relatively easy for plaintiffs to defeat qualified immunity claims simply by alleging that the 
defendant acted maliciously or with an otherwise improper motive.  It speculated that the experience 
of lower courts in applying the subject good faith part of the qualified immunity test demonstrated 
that this test was incompatible with the desire for early termination because disputes about officials 
good faith were often not capable of resolution without a trial.  In other words, such claims were 
likely to require resolution of material fact disputes.) (internal footnotes omitted). 
 246. Hassel, supra note 241, at 130. 
247. Id. at 126. 
 248. Chen, supra note 241 at 236. 
 249. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 
250. Id. at 818; see also Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 
VAND. L. REV. 583, 583 (1998) (Public officials receive qualified immunity from damages liability 
for constitutional violations if they reasonably could have believed their actions were constitutional 
under clearly established law.); Hassel, supra note 241, at 13031. 
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and to promote good government.251  Thus, these new procedures would 
permit unsubstantial lawsuits [to] be quickly terminated.252
Because the new formulation of the qualified immunity defense is 
objective, the Supreme Court stated that it could be determined at the 
beginning of the lawsuit before extensive discovery occurs.253  On 
summary judgment, before any discovery has occurred, the current 
formulation of the qualified immunity defense requires trial courts to 
grant immunity where the law was unclear or, even if the law was clear, 
where a reasonable officer might have mistaken it.254
On summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine, not 
only the currently applicable law, but whether that law was clearly 
established at the time an action occurred.  If the law at that time was 
not clearly established, an official could not reasonably be expected to 
anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor could he fairly be said to 
know that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as 
unlawful.  Until this threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery 
should not be allowed.255
In other words, qualified immunity is appropriate where the general 
legal principal had not been established, where the law changed, where 
the legal standard had been stated only in broad and amorphous terms, or 
where the conduct at issue was not clearly proscribed.256  Thus, after 
Harlow, this new qualified immunity formulation provided not only 
immunity from liability, but also immunity from standing trial.257  In 
addition, to guarantee that defendants entitled to qualified immunity were 
not trapped in litigation, the Supreme Court subsequently held that 
pretrial orders denying qualified immunity were entitled to immediate 
appeal.258
The Supreme Courts procedural framework for evaluating the 
qualified immunity defense has undoubtedly shifted the balance more 
toward authority, and at the expense of accountability according to some 
 251. Hassel, supra note 241, at 133. 
252. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 808 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 50708 (1978)). 
 253. Chen, supra note 241, at 238. 
 254. Jonathan M. Freiman, The Problem of Qualified Immunity: How Conflating 
Microeconomics and Law Subverts the Constitution, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 61, 67 (1997). 
255. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 
 256. David Rudovsky, How to Handle Unreasonable Force Litigation: Prosecution and Defense 
Strategies in Police Misconduct Cases, 590 PRACTISING L. INST./LIT. 259, 274 (1998). 
 257. Hassel, supra note 241, at 131. 
 258. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 52425 (1985); Chen, supra note 241, at 23941 
(discussing Mitchell v. Forsyth). 
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scholars.259  The frequently stated objectives for implementing this new 
framework were to allow early resolution of such claims, to enforce 
defendants right not to stand trial, and arguably to reduce the number of 
such claims.  In these respects, the qualified immunity defense can be 
seen as similar to the business judgment defense.  Both defenses are 
intended to protect defendants from liability except in cases of 
misconduct.  To the extent that the normative judgment is made that the 
business judgment defense must be weighted more toward authority or is 
intended to grant directors immunity from trial when it applies, then the 
procedures developed for qualified immunity defense could help 
accomplish those goals.  The procedural framework of the qualified 
immunity defense could also reduce the number of shareholder 
derivative lawsuits that proceed to discovery and trial, and could 
potentially lessen the filings of such lawsuits. 
Just like the business judgment defense, the qualified immunity 
defense is a standard.260  In adopting the current formulation of the 
qualified immunity doctrine, the Supreme Court implicitly desired to 
avoid federal damages liability for harms that do not clearly reach 
constitutional dimensions and thus eschew[ed] liability except when an 
officials conduct violates well-established constitutional law.261
Although the actual standard for the business judgment defense will 
differ from the qualified immunity defense since constitutional law is not 
the basis of decision in shareholder derivative litigation, limiting the 
scope of director liability may reinforce the authority that directors 
possess by law to manage the corporation as well as avoid litigation and 
director liability for minor or debatable board decisions. 
Similar to the qualified immunity defense, the value of the business 
judgment defense would be enhanced by an early decision on the 
applicability of the defense and by recognition of a right not to stand trial 
(to the benefit of directors and the corporation).  Arguably, some of the 
business judgment defenses value is destroyed when courts permit 
discovery or even trial to invade the directors authority.  Defendants 
259. See infra notes 26267. 
260. Compare Hassel, supra note 241, at 147 (stating that qualified immunity is a standard), with 
Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 128 ([T]he business judgment rule clearly is misnamed; it is a 
standard, not a rule.), and Branson, supra note 101, at 631 (noting the business judgment rule has 
no mandatory content, involves no substantive dos or donts for corporate directors or 
officers, and entail[s] only slight review of business decisions). 
 261. Armacost, supra note 250, at 67980 ([L]imiting rather than expanding the scope of 
liability for constitutional violationsby authorizing its use only against clearly and genuinely 
threatening conductmay be the best way to reinforce the special place of constitutional rights in 
our jurisprudence and maintain the special status of constitutional rights in the public 
consciousness.) (internal footnotes omitted). 
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also may immediately appeal an order denying qualified immunity 
because again the benefit of such immunity is destroyed if the defendant 
must litigate the action.  Similarly, the rationale of the business judgment 
defense suggests that courts should decide the applicability of the 
defense early in litigation. 
The qualified immunity defense, however, may not be a perfect 
analogy.  Although Harlow adopted a primarily objective test, the 
subjective intent of the defendant arguably continues to be relevant in 
those cases where the defendants mental stateintent, malice, or 
motiveis an element of the underlying constitutional claim.262  When 
the motives of the defendant must be considered in the qualified 
immunity analysis, presumably defendants will succeed less often on 
summary judgment because an analysis of the defendants motives 
necessarily entails a fact-intensive review.263  For this reason, to the 
extent the business judgment defense and its underlying fiduciary duties 
are formulated as more objective standards,264 then the procedural 
mechanisms will more effectively preserve the defenses value and 
purposes.  This procedural approach to the business judgment defense 
can accommodate proposals to broaden the fiduciary duties of directors, 
but subjective standards for those duties could undermine the benefits of 
a procedural approach. 
The qualified immunity defense and the other potential analogies 
discussed in Part II, however, demonstrate that finding a balance between 
authority and accountability that satisfies everyone is impossible.  For 
instance, the new formulation for the qualified immunity defense has 
been criticized for provid[ing] several points at which the courts almost 
unfettered judgment determines the outcome of the application of the 
defense.265  Further criticism charges: 
Judges are being asked, in effect, to do what they think is right with 
very little clear cut guidance.  While making the decision about what 
would be just, judges must dress up their conclusions in the 
complicated costume of qualified immunity.  Because they appear 
clothed in the qualified immunity doctrine, the policy choices being 
made about the underlying constitutional rights are hidden.266
 262. Rudovsky, supra note 256, at 27779. 
 263. Chen, supra note 241, at 26263 (arguing that the qualified immunity defense should not be 
viewed as a pure question of law, and that facts play a critical role in such cases). 
 264. For an explanation of objective standards for the fiduciary duties, see Scarlett, supra note 3, 
at 63237. 
 265. Hassel, supra note 241, at 137. 
266. Id. at 147. 
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Others argue that the new standard results in only plaintiffs bringing 
suit against the most egregious flouters of the Constitution hav[ing] any 
possibility of surviving a motion for summary judgment.267  Any 
formulation of the business judgment defense as a purely objective 
standard enforced through procedural mechanisms will likely generate 
some of the same criticisms. 
V. CONCLUSION
As the litigation mechanism that balances directors authority and 
shareholders right to hold directors accountable, the business judgment 
defense serves important purposes that can benefit directors and 
shareholders.  Indirectly, the defense helps to ensure individuals are 
willing to serve as directors and encourages directors to take calculated 
business risks.  Directly, the defense protects directors from liability for 
honest mistakes, for unpopular business decisions, and for decisions that 
are seen as poor ones with the benefit of hindsight.  Since there is no sign 
that courts or legislatures will eliminate shareholder derivative litigation 
or abolish the business judgment defense, the question is how to apply 
the business judgment defense in shareholder derivative litigation so that 
it promotes these important purposes and respects directors authority, 
yet permits shareholders to overcome that defense in cases in which 
directors have abused their power. 
Other areas of law must negotiate similar authority versus 
accountability dilemmas and may present potential analogies for 
resolving that dilemma in shareholder derivative litigation.  For instance, 
the qualified immunity defense and the PLRA both utilize procedural 
mechanisms to ensure that the balance between authority and 
accountability is weighted toward authority.  If a normative judgment is 
made that the balance in shareholder derivative litigation should continue 
to be weighted more toward authority as contemplated by the original 
rationales of the business judgment defense, then the analogy presented 
by the qualified immunity defense suggests procedural mechanisms that 
can be applied to the business judgment defense for that purpose.  As the 
scholarship addressing the authority versus accountability dilemma in 
other areas of law demonstrates, however, even if such an approach 
 267. Freiman, supra note 254, at 68; cf. Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: 
Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Courts Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L.
REV. 1097, 1130 (2006) (Among the significant modern doctrinal impediments to litigation, the 
development of qualified immunity for government officials accused of violating the civil rights of 
private citizens almost certainly deserves pride of place.). 
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strikes a better balance between authority and accountability in the 
corporate context, some scholars will likely continue to call for more 
accountability because a perfect balance that satisfies all constituencies 
in all cases is impossible. 
